To: WTO Trips Negotiators
From: James Love, CPTech
Date: 16 December 2002
Re: New Chairman's December 16, 2002 Text for para 6 negotiations
CPTech asks the WTO delegates to reject the 16 December 2002
Chairman's text. This is based upon the following:
In paragraph 1(a), the scope of diseases is limited to
"the public health problems as recognized in paragraph 1 of
the Declaration." The USTR will clearly use this as a
greenlight to limit the declaration to the diseases
mentioned in the paragraph 1 and exclude others, and they
will also focus on the "gravity" language.
We recognize the gravity of the public health
problems afflicting many developing and least-
developed countries, especially those resulting
from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other
epidemics.
There is no legitimate reason to focus on paragraph 1
of the Declaration in terms of paragraph 6, except for
the desire of the United States, Japan, Canada,
Australia and the European Union to renegotiate the
entire Doha Declaration and limit the paragraph 6
"solution" in ways that paragraph 4 is not. The scope
of diseases for paragraph 6 should be the same as those
relevant to paragraph 5 regarding compulsory licensing,
and that is the text of paragraph 4.
It is dead certain that countries will regret ever
having agreed that the Doha Declaration is restricted
to "the public health problems as recognized in
paragraph 1 of the Declaration." The US and PhRMA,
with the backing of Japan, EU, Canada and Australia,
will hammer away at a solution until it is limited in
application to the diseases specifically mentioned in
the last part of paragraph 1.
Lack of clarity has not been useful for developing
countries, and whatever is unclear will work against
the developing countries.
- The footnote 3 in paragraph 1.b is highly
protectionist, and says that developing countries will not
be allowed to supply rich countries, even when the rich
country is buying from a generic supplier. This will work
against technology transfer in very profound ways.
- The safeguards are inappropriate, particularly those
that require notification to the WTO TRIPS Council. The
information required to be provided to the TRIPS Council
will be used to increase bilateral pressure on weak
countries on both the importing and exporting sides. The WTO
will have an explicit mandate to monitor individual
licenses, and become deeply involved in issues now left to
national discretion under Article 1 of the TRIPS. This is a
major change in the role of the WTO and major loss of
sovereignty.
- The proposal requires compensation to be determined in
the exporting country, which is contrary to any logical
analysis of who should determine affordability, a loss of
national sovereignty for the importing country, and may
undermine compulsory licensing as a means to promote
affordable medicines.
- The safeguards on re-importation to other countries
will be costly for developing countries, and used to
discourage the use of compulsory licensing. There is no
evidence that generic drugs are being re-imported in the
rich countries in any significant amount.
- The regional trade agreement provision is totally
biased. The European Union has told CPTech it intends to
have its proposed community patent system overcome its own
regional 31.f problem, but would greatly limit this in the
developing world, because of the requirement that at least
half the members be LDCs. Europe of course is not made up
of poor countries.
- The technology transfer paragraph 7 is insultingly
weak, and is undermined by the rest of the agreement, such
as footnote 3, and also quite importantly in the way the
capacity issue is defined. (see below).
- Paragraph 9 of the Chairman's text continues not to
address the major issue: will this deal prejudice a
unilateral Article 30 case modeled after the EU Amendment
196? The text could clarify this issue. We asked that it be
clarified. But it is not clarified. The fact that it isn't
fixed illustrates how desperate the US and the EU are to
stop an Article 30 case from succeeding.
- The Annex provisions on the Assessment of Manufacturing
Capacities in the Pharmaceutical Sector are of course very
narrow, and will likely be used against Nigeria, South
Africa, Kenya, Ghana, Brazil, Korea, Thailand, and nearly
any other country that has any level of economic
development. What is so appalling about this section and so
important is that the problems should never have been framed
in terms of capacity. Canada, the United States, the EU,
Japan and other understood intimately that the real issue
concerns economies of scale. Last summer, USTR was willing
to discuss economies of scale, but then PhRMA took over the
US position. In this draft, *any* economic development in
the area of pharmaceuticals will eliminate the usefulness of
this "solution."
It should be obvious that the US, EU, Japan, Canada and
Australia delegates are controlled by PhRMA interests, and
further, that this proposal is designed to:
- Limit the importance of the Doha Declaration,
- Prejudice more fundamental and sustainable fixes to the
31.f problems,
- Create more and not less uncertainly regarding what can
and cannot be done,
- Give the US and the EU a big public relations bonanza
which will be cruelly use as the basis for more bilateral
pressure against the use of compulsory licenses and against
better export strategies, as well as a basis to leverage
additional concessions from developing countries in other
WTO negotiations.
No developing country needs this deal. There is already a
15-year window for exports in Paragraph 7 and other
strategies such as 31.k and possibly Article 30 that are
better. This "deal" will be used against developing
countries for many, many years.