Jennifer Ellen Mattson
University of California at Berkeley / CPTech
April 20th, 2005
Menem's First Administration: 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Menem's Second Administration: 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
During the first Administration of Argentine President Carlos Saul Menem, the US applied pressure to officials in the Argentine government to pass a patent law for pharmaceuticals. At the time, Argentina was plagued by enormous sums of foreign debt accrued during the 1980s and severe bouts of hyperinflation. Because the process and composition of pharmaceuticals have historically been considered a public good in Argentina, they were not eligible for patents. This lack of patent protection facilitated the success of a large Argentine non-research-based pharmaceutical industry that copied and produced foreign drugs to the dismay of the research-based multinational drug industry, which insisted upon compensation for its research and development of new drugs.
August 10th, 1989
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Progress Stalls on Pharmaceutical Registration Reform," Cable 1614 to the US Secretary of State, February 1990.
September 1989
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, Cable 3101 to the US Secretary of State, March 1990.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Progress Stalls on Pharmaceutical Registration Reform," Cable 1614 to the US Secretary of State, February 1990.
December 11th, 1989
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Progress Stalls on Pharmaceutical Registration Reform," Cable 1614 to the US Secretary of State, February 1990.
December 18th, 1989
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Progress Stalls on Pharmaceutical Registration Reform," Cable 1614 to the US Secretary of State, February 1990.
December 1989
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "New Secretary of Industry and Foreign Trade: Towards a More Open Economy," Cable 0584 to the US Secretary of State, DC, January 1990.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Pharmaceutical Industry Adjustment and Implications for Patent Issue," Cable 0092 to the US Secretary of State, January 1990.
According to a source from the multinational pharmaceutical industry who met with the Embassy's economic counselor, the agreement involved a 25% increase in the price of prescription drugs and a 24% savings on suppliers' credits for pharmaceutical companies. Earlier, the Argentine government had mandated that pharmaceutical companies give pharmacies interest-free credits for up to 18 days; the new agreement allows firms to charge market interest rates for these loans. The Argentine government also agrees to a 125% increase in the pharmodollar, the exchange rate for pharmaceuticals, which will be maintained until January 21st, 1990. The same industry source expressed satisfaction with the agreement, but predicted that all drug prices would reach the price ceiling, "despite the low cost of production for the large majority of these products" because of uncertainty created by the price control system.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Pharmaceutical Industry Adjustment and Implications for Patent Issue," Cable 0092 to the US Secretary of State, January 1990.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Pharmaceutical Industry Adjustment and Implications for Patent Issue," Cable 0092 to the US Secretary of State, January 1990.
On the structural adjustment side, pharmaceutical price and exchange rate controls in the midst of a rapid rise in the dollar (A650 to A1550) and surging inflation caused local producers in mid-December to cut off the supply of drugs to the local market. This action got the GOA's attention and led to the approval of sizzable (sic) price increases for prescription drugs. The GOA also took the opportunity to eliminate a market distorting forced loan requirement. However, by early January price disorientation caused pharmacies to again close. This time the root of the problem shifted to the retail level, and the government threatened to apply the anti-hording law. The closure of the pharmacies and access to drug has become a significant social issue, drawing considerable media attention. The willingness of national labs to cut off the supply of drugs to the local market in mid-December flies in the face of their argument that the absence of patent protection allows them to ensure Argentine consumers a constant supply of medicine.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Pharmaceutical Industry Adjustment and Implications for Patent Issue," Cable 0092 to the US Secretary of State, January 1990.
January 10th, 1990
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "New Secretary of Industry and Foreign Trade: Towards a More Open Economy," Cable 0584 to the US Secretary of State, January 1990.
January 12th, 1990
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "New Secretary of Industry and Foreign Trade: Towards a More Open Economy," Cable 0584 to the US Secretary of State, January 1990.
Mid-February, 1990
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Progress Stalls on Pharmaceutical Registration Reform," Cable 1614 to the US Secretary of State, February 1990.
The local head of a major US pharmaceutical said that foreign labs had noticed some improvement, but that foreign labs had registration applications that still had not moved. He claimed that this was not due to discrimination, but only to the need to payoff Secretary Menendez to have products registered. Other than Menendez, he had no idea how high or deep such payoffs went.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Progress Stalls on Pharmaceutical Registration Reform," Cable 1614 to the US Secretary of State, February 1990.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Progress Stalls on Pharmaceutical Registration Reform," Cable 1614 to the US Secretary of State, February 1990.
March 23rd, 1990
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Ambassador, Cavallo Review Bilateral Issues," Cable 3101 to the US Secretary of State, March 1990.
May 11th, 1990
Dominguez emphasized that his labs were interested in making contact with labs of similar size in the states. He thought such American labs were dynamic and doing research that some of his membership might be able to hook into. His membership did not have the capital to do primary research, but some were capable of doing investigations into additional uses for already discovered molecules. He also pointed out that the laws regulating research and testing in Argentina were much more flexible than in the US, providing US firms with the possibility to complete tests more quickly than might be done in the states. He also pointed out that the Argentine labs have capable scientists willing to work at much lower costs.Ambassador Todman concludes from his meeting with Dominguez that incentives for small Argentine labs to support patent legislation may provide a route for US influence on Government considerations. He comments in his cable to Secretary Baker:
We are encouraged that the GOA may be gearing up to move on a patent law. While the general direction is favorable, we take Dominguez's warning seriously that CILFA still has not given up its opposition. This leaves us concerned about the contents of such a law. We still need to build allies among the national labs, and COOPERALA provides such an opportunity. At this point the PMA should be encouraged to look for some potential carrots so that we can use them to show the GOA and the local labs there can be tangible, near-term benefits from the adoption of product patent protection. It would be most useful if the PMA could provide use with contacts among its smaller members who would be interested in hearing out COOPERALA about what such labs could offer the Americans in cooperative arrangements once a strong product patent protection law is in place in Argentina. It would also be useful to include such members in the PMA delegation to visit Argentina.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "National Labs Prepare for Patent Law Change," Cable 4964 to the US Secretary of State, May 1990.
May 12th, 1990
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "National Labs Prepare for Patent Law Change," Cable 4964 to the US Secretary of State, May 1990.
June 8th, 1990
See US Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Proposed Schedule for the Visit of Ambassador Hills to Buenos Aires," Cable 5012 to the US Secretary of State, May 1990.
Minister of Health and Social Action Eduardo Bauza will later (August 9th, 1990) tell the Clarin, a Buenos Aires daily newspaper, that during her visit, Ambassador Hill threatened Argentine government officials with a tariff on all Argentine exports to the United States if no changes to Argentine patent policy have been made by September 1991. The same issue of the Clarin quotes Ambassador Hill as saying during her visit that without patent protection for pharmaceuticals, Argentina will not have access to foreign investment and no anti-protectionist agricultural agreement will be incorporated in the Uruguay Round.
See US Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Pharmaceutical Patents: Press Reports GOA Willing to Comply with US Request," Cable 8145 to the US Secretary of State, August 1990.
June 19th, 1990
Secretary Bauza tells Ambassador Todman that the Argentine cabinet has created an interagency committee on patents. In a June 1990 cable to US Secretary of State James Baker, Ambassador Todman asks for the input of Washington agencies and the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of America in advance of a July meeting with the committee.
The cable also reports that Menendez told economic section officials in a side conversation that registrations, which she claimed had been on hold while the ministry considered reforms, would be recommenced at the end of the month. However, a comment from Ambassador Todman in the cable suggests another reason for the halting of registrations:
The registration process had been halted by Bauza after the Ambassador raised the issue of corruption in the registration process with both Foreign Minister Domingo Cavallo and Bauza in separate meetings.
See American Embassy, "Pharmaceutical Discussion with Minister of Health," Cable 6246 to the US Secretary of State, June 1990.
Note: The Embassy's concerns about possible corruption stem from a mid-February discussion with an industry executive who reported that increasing the speed of the registration process required paying a bribe to Secretary Menendez.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Progress Stalls on Pharmaceutical Registration," Cable 1614 to the US Secretary of State, February 1990.
During the June 19th meeting, Menendez also promises Embassy officials that the Ministry will "issue the new lists requested by the Embassy and local members of the PMA."
Ambassador Todman's comments on the meeting in his cable to Secretary Baker demonstrate optimism in his ability to persuade Bauza of the need for patent recognition and call for industry leadership in the continued drive to "convert" Bauza and other lobbying efforts:
While the meeting seemed to start with the Minister looking for ways to modify the GOA's promise on patent, by the end he was discussing ways to sell the issue to patent opponents. Nevertheless, the conversion of Minister Bauza is far from complete. We will be looking forward to a persuasive and concise reply form the PMA on prices and other benefits for Argentina to keep the ball rolling with the Minister as well as for use on Congressmen, the press, and in the GOA interagency committee.
See American Embassy, "Pharmaceutical Discussion with Minister of Health," Cable 6246 to the US Secretary of State, June 1990.
June 20th, 1990
See American Embassy, "Pharmaceutical Discussion with Minister of Health," Cable 6246 to the US Secretary of State, June 1990.
August 3rd, 1990
Ambassador Todman complains in an August, 1990 cable to US Secretary of State James Baker that foreign labs continue to delay their public response to anti-patent arguments by CILFA, the association of large local labs, in the Argentine press:
We remain concerned that that the foreign labs continue to delay the presentation of their case for patents to the Argentine public. The foreign labs had been talking for the last two months about running ads against the anti-patent press campaign but the further delay of 30-60 days has left the public and Congress with little but the CILFA propaganda to consider. We need more than moral support and promises from the PMA if we are to ensure a satisfactory resolution to the patent issue in Argentina.
See US Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Pharmaceutical Issue," Cable 8143 to the US Secretary of State, August 1990.
August, 1990
The Clarin report includes a statement by Minister of Health Eduardo Bauza that in July, US Trade Representative Carla Hill had threatened that a lack of progress in pharmaceutical patents by September 1991 would result in a import tariff surcharge on all Argentine exports to the United States. The article quotes Ambassador Hill as saying that without patents, Argentina would face a decreased supply of foreign investment and a removal of the discussion of anti-protectionist agricultural agreement in the GATT from the realm of possibility.
See US Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Pharmaceutical Patents: Press Reports GOA Willing to Comply with US Request," Cable 8145 to the US Secretary of State, August 1990.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Press Reactions to Announcement of Intended Pharmaceutical Patent Recognition," Cable 8686 to the US Secretary of State, August 1990.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Press Reactions to Announcement of Intended Pharmaceutical Patent Recognition," Cable 8686 to the US Secretary of State, August 1990.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Press Reactions to Announcement of Intended Pharmaceutical Patent Recognition," Cable 8686 to the US Secretary of State, August 1990.
September 7th, 1990
Perlusky tells the Embassy officials that he attended a recent meeting between CILFA and President Menem, who refused to reverse his decision to introduce a patent law despite CILFA's assertion that such a law would bankrupt its members. Dr. Perlusky conveyed to US officials his skepticism toward CILFA's claims of financial endangerment.
The Embassy economic counselor asks Perlusky about a recent statement by Minister Cavallo that the Argentine government is considering asking for an Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) loan to assist local labs in adapting to a patent system. Perlusky says that the government is considering making such a request, but that no specifics have been discussed with the IDB.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "First Impressions of the New Under Secretary for Health: Pharmaceutical Patents," Cable 9427 to the US Secretary of State, September 1990.
September 10th, 1990
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "First Impressions of the New Under Secretary for Health: Pharmaceutical Patents," Cable 9427 to the US Secretary of State, September 1990.
November 6th, 1990
Ambassador Todman reports in a November, 1990 cable to US Secretary of State Jim Baker:
Pritchard opened the substantive portion of the meeting by explaining the benefits that a sound patent law would bring Argentina: new investment and the gainful employment in significant research of Argentina's scientific talent. Anticipating questions on pricing, Pritchard pointed to the Italian case where pharmaceutical prices rose slower than prices overall following the enactment of a sound pharmaceutical law.Speaking for the CAEME labs, Buxhoeden said that his members were ready to work to improve Argentina's pharmaceutical industry. Among other efforts, his members would be willing collaborators in developing a program as in the past to provide medicine to the poor, who are outside the social security system. In addition the foreign labs are disposed to expand their research activities in Argentina. Lopez Pardo praised the new direction for Argentina, mentioning that a sound patent law would encourage foreign labs to expand their cooperation in research and licensing with local labs. (Comment: Several of the foreign labs report that they are already negotiating licensing agreements with CILFA members, who want to be better positioned for pharmaceutical patents. End comment.)
Menem pointed out that Argentina was working on a solution to the patent issue in compliance with the GOA's commitment to present patent legislation to the Congress by September 1991. This effort is in accord with this government's larger goal of eliminating all non-transparent processes. The presence of his three ministers, he pointed out, demonstrated his administration's serious commitment to the issue. He welcomed CAEME's willingness to participate in a program to help the poor obtain needed pharmaceuticals.
The foreign minister said that the GOA (sic) has moving forward on the issue in the context of the GATT round ______________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________. He encouraged the PMA members and CAEME to deepen their dialogue with key CILFA members to head off such tactics. Minister Gonzalez added that during his short period as Minister of Health, he successfully brought the domestic and foreign labs together to agree on a change in the registration processes. He hoped the same could occur now for the patent (issue) to keep this form developing into and ideological (division) in the Congress.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Menem Receives PMA Vice Presidents," Cable 11509 to the US Secretary of State, November 1990.
November 30th, 1990
See May, Michael A., Letter to Reinhold Buxhoeveden and Alberto Irigoyen, Buenos Aires, 11 December 1990.
December 11th, 1990
See May, Michael A., Letter to Reinhold Buxhoeveden and Alberto Irigoyen, Buenos Aires, 11 December 1990.
December 14th, 1990
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Italian Pharmaceutical Patent Case Understudy in GOA," Cable 12881 to the US Secretary of State, December 1990.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "CILFA's Latest Against Patents," Cable 0388 to the US Secretary of State, Washington DC, January 1991.
February 1991
See US Secretary of State, "Responding to CILFA on Pharmaceutical Patents," Cable 40526 to the US Embassy in Buenos Aires, February 1991.
February 20th, 1991
Early March, 1991
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Further Contacts on Pharmaceuticals," Cable 01958 to the US Secretary of State, March 1991.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Further Contacts on Pharmaceuticals," Cable 01958 to the US Secretary of State, March 1991.
March 4th, 1991
American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Ambassador's Call on Health and Social Action Minister Porto," Cable 2113 to the US Secretary of State, March 1991.
Mid-March, 1991
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Pharmaceutical Patents: Comments by the New GOA Ambassador to the US," Cable 02636 to the US Secretary of State, March 1991.
Powerful domestic interests oppose GOA acceptance of this property right. While there is diminished ideological support for the pirates' position, the issue could be exploited in a demagogic anti-American manner. The downside for the US would be not only less than acceptable IPR protection but an important setback to the overall relationship.Although he recognizes Ambassador Hills has authority over the Special 301 list, Ambassador Todman asks that "the Embassy (and the Department) be notified, in advance, when possible by cable, of any high level approaches and be given an opportunity to provide our view on what tactics will work best."
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Pharmaceutical Patents in Argentina," Cable 02732 to the US Secretary of State, March 1991.
March 25th, 1991
See US Embassy, Buenos Aires, "CODEL Bradley Meeting with Argentine Foreign Minister Di Tella," Cable 03077 to the US Secretary of State, April 1991.
March 26th, 1991
Ambassador Todman reports in an April 1991 cable to US Secretary of State Jim Baker:
In response to Senator Bradley's question on the possibilities of favorable legislative action to pass an intellectual property right bill, Menem stated this would not be easy. He described efforts by local pharmaceutical companies to finance a media campaign against patent protection for drugs. This campaign stresses the possibility of unemployment in the local laboratories and the high prices which will result from patent protection. _____ stated the executive branch will use all of its forces to get the law passed. He fully supports these efforts and expects no problem _____________. The Chamber of Deputies, however, is another problem. _____ said he and other GOA officials hope to complete action on this legislation before Congress changes in December, since the Peronists could lose seats in the Chamber of Deputies in the September elections.Senator Bradley then outlined the US Congress's concern that "research and development costs need to be recovered in order to promote new research."
See US Embassy, Buenos Aires, "CODEL Bradley Meeting with Senator Eduardo Menem," Cable 03109 to the US Secretary of State, April 1991.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "State of Play on Patents," Cable 02947 to the US Secretary of State, April 1991.
March 27th, 1991
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Foreign Minister Seeks Special GSP Treatment in Exchange for Patent Law," Cable 2920 to the US Secretary of State, March 1991.
In an April cable to US Secretary of State James Baker, Ambassador Todman reports:
The group said they had prepared a lobbying plan, and were educating themselves on the issue to become more effective lobbyists. They are carrying out a public information campaign, and preparing additional material to counter a CILFA (patent pirate organization) media blitz, that they anticipate will take place once a bill is introduced in the Congress. The pro-patent think tank CEDIQUIFA is putting together a seminar on the issue for early June. The Ambassador encouraged them to push ahead with their publicity effort.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "State of Play on Patents," Cable 02947 to the US Secretary of State, April 1991.
April 1991
See US Secretary of State, "Argentina: Special 301 Announcement," Cable to the US Embassy in Buenos Aires, April 1991.
May 3rd, 1991
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Update on Pharmaceuticals," Cable 04306 to the US Secretary of State, May 1991.
Mid-May, 1991
See Aronson, Bernard, "Meeting with Argentine Foreign Minister Guido Di Tella," Briefing Memorandum.
May 24th, 1991
June 1991
See US Secretary of State, "Enlisting European Support for Improved IPR Protection in South America," Cable 197873 to the US Embassies in Bern, Bonn, London, Paris, Rome, and the Hague, June 1991.
July 1991
US Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Priority for IPR Administration," Cable 07046 to the US Secretary of State, July 1991.
August 6th, 1991
American Embassy, Buenos Aires, Cable to the US Secretary of State, August 1991.
Late August 1991
With the deadline for the GOA's introduction of a new patent law less than a month away, the local association of pharmaceutical patent pirates (CILFA) seems to have stepped up its campaign to ensure the new law will provide only minimal rights. Continuing to equate patents with monopoly rights in its newspaper and television advertisements, CILFA is hammering (sic) way with its claims that patents will greatly increase the price of pharmaceuticals to pensioners. The ads draw a picture of pensioners without vital medicine and a picture of the public health care system losing up to a USD billion a year. CILFA continues to preach that any new law must contain strong compulsory licensing provisions.The CILFA campaign has successfully generated some public political support as the September 8th elections near. The radical party recently issued a public statement against patents. In addition the Health Minister for Buenos Aires Province, Gonzalez Garcia, was reported to have told a pharmaceutical convention that Argentina "cannot recognize medical patents on the terms requested by the developed world" which would force its people to pay "outrageous" prices for medical products.
The local PMA representatives (CAEME) have so far been working behind the scenes in trying to undo the CILFA successes. When CAEME's lobbyist on patents questioned the head of the radical block in the House about his party's public position, the Deputy claimed not to be aware of the reasons his party had taken such a stand. The lobbyist has taken this response to mean that the (sic) radically commitment could be reversed.
Nevertheless, the local PMA representatives (CAEME) have been slow to organize against CILFA's stepped up public campaign. CAEME has promised ECONOFF that a newspaper and television counteroffensive is being prepared. CAEME hopes to have its rebuttal to the public by the first week of September. Meanwhile, the GOA's Minister of Health Porto told an August 26 conference on the economic plan that he would soon be sending a draft of a new bill to the President's office for approval, before forwarding it to the Congress.
Comment: The Embassy is concerned that CAEME continues to be slow off the mark in confronting CILFA's anti-patent publicity campaign. In the past CAEME has been reluctant to publicly refute CILFA's claims on the price effects of patents, despite significant data that could be used in this regard. A concise treatment on prices and the willingness of the R and D based industry to sign licensing agreements after the Chilean and especially the Mexican laws were passed, would go a long way towards knocking the philosophical legs out form under the anti-patent campaign.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Anti-Patent Campaign Heats Up," Cable 08429 to the US Secretary of State, August 1991.
August 28th, 1991
American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Patents: Foreign Minister Publicizes Potential 301 Retaliation," Cable 08523 to the US Secretary of State, August 1991.
September 10th, 1991
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Patent Talks," Cable 09218 to the US Secretary of State, September 1991.
September 21st-26th, 1991
Presidential Chief of Staff Eduardo Bauza is quoted in Pagina 12 September 24th as saying that the Ambassador was entitled to his opinions, but did not have the right to interfere in Argentine domestic affairs.
La Nacion political correspondent Angel Anaya accuses Ambassador Todman of overstepping his duties and earning the nickname "Braden II" given to him by Argentine government officials in an editorial published September 26th. The nickname refers to US Ambassador Spruille Braden, who was outspoken in his opposition to Argentina's Peronist government.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "CILFA Aims Low to Halt Patent Law," Cable to the US Secretary of State, October 1991. (Cable number is illegible.)
CILFA continued to keep the pressure on the Ambassador and the GOA by promoting ( according to the Buenos Aires daily "Clarin") a resolution in the National Chamber of Deputies urging the GOA to declare Ambassador Todman "persona non grata" for interference in Argentine domestic affairs. The Peronist house leadership managed late September 26th to remit the legislation to a death-in-committee, but not until 76 legislators had gone on record in favor of it.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "CILFA Aims Low to Halt Patent Law," Cable to the US Secretary of State, October 1991. (Cable number is illegible.)
September 27th, 1991
In a private meeting with Ambassador Todman, President Menem clarifies that he does not consider the Ambassador's efforts as an intrusion into domestic Argentine affairs.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "CILFA Aims Low to Halt Patent Law," Cable to the US Secretary of State, October 1991. (Cable number is illegible.)
October 2nd, 1991
The article also reports that the Argentine government is considering a bill to require prescriptions to be written by the scientific name as opposed to the brand name in order to increase competition within the generic industry.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Press Reports Ministerial Decision on Patent Bill," Cable 09808 to the US Secretary of State, Washington DC, October 1991.
October 4th, 1991
October 10th, 1991
Ambassador Todman comments in his October 1991 cable to the US Secretary of State:
Embassy's preliminary, inexpert reading is that law as submitted is responsive to most US major concerns. This is only the first step and congressional approval will not be easy. Close associate of Minister Cavallo told DCM October 10th that Cavallo had said that the "guns of Navarone" will be needed to get the bill through Congress.
December 1991
See US Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Congressional Debate on Patents and Patent Office Problems," Cable 12261 to the US Secretary of State, December 1991
Pablo Challu, "The Consequences of Pharmaceutical Product Patenting" Off-Prints of World Competition, December 1991.
December 10th, 1991
December 27th, 1991
American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Technical Assistance for GOA Patent Office," Cable 12984 to the US Secretary of State, December 1991.
American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "GOA Request for Technical Assistance for New Patent Office," Cable 00838 to the US Secretary of State, January 1992.
January 23rd, 1992
Carlos Villagra, secretary general of a major pharmacy industry group, says that with such a decree on generics, his organization will support pharmaceutical patents.
CILFA and CAEME both oppose the order: as Embassy officer James M. Derham notes in a February 1992 cable to the US Secretary of State, "the marketing investments of both groups have long been directed at convincing doctors to prescribe their products."
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "GOA Decree on Generic Drug Prescriptions," Cable 01363 to the US Secretary of State, February 1992.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "GOA Decree on Generic Drug Prescriptions," Cable 01363 to the US Secretary of State, February 1992.
February 6th, 1992
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Congress Set for February 17 Special Session; Patents Law Expected to be Considered," Cable 01306 to the US Secretary of State, February 1992.
February 10th, 1992
American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "GOA Decree on Generic Drug Prescriptions," Cable 01363 to the US Secretary of State, February 1992.
Mid to Late February, 1992
American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Request for Assistance in Arranging Argentine Deputies' IPR visit to Washington," Cable 01544 to the US Secretary of State, February 1992.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Expansion of GOA Deputies' IPR visit to Washington," Cable 01970 to the US Secretary of State, February 1992.
February 27th, 1992
March 6th, 1992
See US Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Top GOA Administration Offices Commit to Push for Passage of Patent Bill," Cable 02583 to the US Secretary of State, Washington, March 1992.
March 9th, 1992
See US Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Top GOA Administration Offices Commit to Push for Passage of Patent Bill," Cable 02583 to the US Secretary of State, Washington, March 1992.
Mid- March, 1992
Alejandro Zaia, a lobbyist for CAEME, will join the delegation to DC.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Additional Interests of GOA Deputies," Cable 02584 to the US Secretary of State, March 1992.
March 16th, 1992
American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Patent Legislation and S and T Cooperation," Cable 02945 to the US Secretary of State, March 1992.
April 9th, 1992
American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Cavallo Comments on Patent Law," Cable 03665 to the US Secretary of State, April 1992.
April 15th, 1992
American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Legislative Strategy for Patent Bill Passage" Cable 03924 to the US Secretary of State, April 1992.
April 20th, 1992
American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Generic Drug Resolution" Cable 04506 to the US Secretary of State, May 1992.
May 12th, 1992
American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Patent Law - Discussion with Diputado Yoma" Cable 04938 to the US Secretary of State, May 1992.
May 27th, 1992
Cavallo says the first draft of the industry committee's report on the bill is unsatisfactory, and that the passage of an acceptable bill will require lobbying from himself, other ministers, and the President. The President has the power to veto specific parts of a law, but this power is limited. Cavallo asks that the US emphasize in its discussions with other Argentine ministers that free trade agreements with the US would not be possible without intellectual property protection.
American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Minister Cavallo's Comments on US-Argentine Trade Issues" Cable 05518 to the US Secretary of State, May 1992.
June 19th, 1992
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Menem Notes Need for Swift Implementation of Pending Patents Legislation" Cable 05400 to the US Secretary of State, May 1992.
Late June, 1992
American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Minister of Health Pledges Support for Patent Bill" Cable 06047 to the US Secretary of State, May 1992.
American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "_________ Gives His Priorities, Patents Bill is Not One of Them" Cable 06737 to the US Secretary of State, May 1992.
August 1992
As part of the Embassy's effort to maintain pressure on the GOA for passage of sound IPR legislation, the Ambassador raised the issue with Argentina's Ambassador to the United States, Carlos Ortiz the Rozas, and other senior foreign ministry officials including Secretary Petrella, Undersecretary Pfirter, Assistant Under Secretary for Mercosur Abra, and North American desk director Dalton during an August 10th meeting. In raising the question, the Ambassador noted that sound IPR protection was our number one economic issue with Argentina. He pointed out that he had discussed the topic personally with President Menem, Ministers Cavallo, Di Tella, Araoz, and Secretary General of the Presidency Bauza and others in the executive branch. However, he was abstaining form personally lobbying Congress, because of the sensitivities shown by that body. Beyond patents, he said, it was important to have a broad scope law protecting intellectual property, since this would have an effect on the level of our cooperation in science and technology as well as on the attitudes towards investing in Argentina. The Ambassador noted that if the patent portion of the issue were not resolved soon, pressure could easily develop for another 301 action, and asked what might be done.Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas recommended that the US enlist foreign labs from other countries to lobby for patents and to incorporate non-pharmaceutical companies interested in the broader idea of intellectual property protection.Ortiz de Rozas and Undersecretary of Foreign Relations, Rogelio Pfirter, commented that the issue could be resolved only through a lobbying effort by the pharmaceutical companies. Undersecretary for economic integration Jesus Sabra noted the concern of opponents of the law that the law could lead to an increase in pharmaceutical prices.
American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "IPR / Patent Effort: Discussion with Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas" Cable 08408 to the US Secretary of State, May 1992.
Early September 1992
1. Summary and Action RequestAfter 11 months of drifting, indications are that the administration's patent bill may be gaining momentum in the Chamber of Deputies. The Ambassador has continued to receive commitments of support from top officials, while ecouns and econoff have met with several groups of Congressmen in recent weeks and pressed for their support of the bill. German labs have come up with USD 69 thousand for a renewed public relations campaign. Should this momentum begin to flag due to continuing strong opposition, we would like to be in a position to note at the highest levels of the Argentine executive branch that there is a growing concern in Washington about the delay.
(THE ACTION REQUEST IS CENSORED.)
Why the bill has drifted in the Congress
2. Supporters of the Menem administration's bill have faced both procedural and political obstacles since the bill entered the Chamber of Deputies, October 10 1991. Upon arrival the bill was sent immediately to eight committees, a maneuver which senior Peronist deputies recognize was instigated by opponents to complicate the legislative process. The industry committee has the lead, with the committees for science and technology, health and commerce in a second tier of importance. While leaders in the key committees have plowed ahead, some have been influenced by the local labs' attempt to amend the bill.
Industry Committees
3. For example, the president of the industry committee Iribarne told econoff that he supports the administration's bill but is pushing for three changes, which are damaging. He wants to:
He claims to agree with a duration of 20 years, although his staffer argues for a limit of 15 years, along the lines of Chile.
- delete the article which allows importation to be considered sufficient as meeting a "working" requirement,
- replace pipeline protection with a phase-in period, and
- allow parallel importation of patented products.
4. CAEME (local association of multinational pharmaceutical firms) lobbyists explained that the committee's work on the patent bill came to a halt after administration officials told Iribarne that his changes were completely unacceptable. Iribarne's committee turned its attention to a fishing bill that has also been a difficult issue for the government. He planned to finish that work before taking up patents again.
Health Committee
5. The head of the health committee Deputy Corchuelo Blasco claims to support the administration's bill, but believes CILFA's (anti-patent association of large local firms) data on prices. Like Iribarne, Corchuelo Blasco wants a phase-in period. He also calls for freer GOA discretion in granting compulsory licenses.
Commerce Committee
6. Deputy Lopez, the head of the commerce committee, remains an indifferent supporter of the bill.
Science and Technology Committee
7. The president of the S and T committee, Deputy Nacul, actively defends the administration's bill, and suggests that patent supporters need a more concrete presentation of the benefits that IPR protection can bring Argentina. He emphasizes that "price effect" is a key issue for deputies and recommends that the research industry attempt to further substantiate in "common sense" fashion the neutral price effects of patents. He also believes it would be helpful if the research industry could demonstrate some intent to invest, once the legal climate improves.
Insufficient administration emphasis in the Congress
8. All our interlocutors agreed that top Menem administration officials had not, until recently, (sic) push hard for the bill within the Congress, despite commitments from the President on down to work for passage. Typical was (sic) Iribarne understandings that improving IPR protection is one of the administration's concerns, but he claimed not to have received word from a top official that the time had come to move the legislation.
9. The administration's new pointman on patents is undersecretary for industry Carlos Magarinos. He enjoys a direct line of communications with Cavallo on the issue that bypasses the undersecretary's more immediate superior, Secretary of Industry and Commerce Schiaretti. We have heard from both lobbyists and Deputies that Magarino's message to the Congress on behalf of Economy / Minister Cavallo is: "no amendments to the administration's bill."
Other political distractions
11. While the controversy over reforming the constitution is no longer the distraction it was for Deputies, other issues have arisen to divert their attention from work on the more arcane legislation of economic reform. The Peronist bloc leadership is under fire for its inability to deliver a united party for a vote on the Chilean border treaty. With recriminations flying, attentions turned to replacing the leadership of the bloc.
12. Meanwhile, Iribarne has been pulled out of the Congress by his political mentor, Mayor Grosso of the Federal Capital. In accepting the top post in Grosso's council, Iribarne asked for three months leave from the Congress. It now seems likely that he will be forced to give up the chairmanship of the committee. CAEME lobbyists believe that Deputy (CENSORED)
13. Finally, lethargy in the Congress is another problem for patents. Congress has lost the sense of urgency it felt in early 1991 when inflation forced a change in the economic team. After 18 months of stability, Iribarne said, his fellow deputies are no longer seized with the country's economic problems.
Reason for hope
14. Despite obstacles, there is good reason to believe success is still possible, if a renewed effort is made. From (sic) Iribarne perspective, President Menem still has a sufficient following in the Congress to get a patent bill approved. Iribarne recognized that the patent issue is not likely to produce the same emotional division among his colleagues as some of the other legislation under discussion.
15. We continue to receive very positive responses in our contacts with senior administration officials. The Ambassador is seeking out new political channels for our message as well as renewing commitments from top officials. In a recent visit to President Menem's province of La Rioja, the Ambassador pressed the issue with Governor Arnuado. (CENSORED).
16. CAEME lobbyists report that La Rioja Deputy Yoma, an in-law of Menem's and a member of the industry committee, has written a favorable report on the bill with the support of Undersecretary Magarinos. We understand that Yoma has gathered sufficient support in the committee to move his report to the floor. Yoma recently met with Menem on the issue and reportedly receive the President's support. After Yoma got bloc leader Matzkin to speak to Menem, the bloc leader reportedly told his Deputies that the party would back Yoma's report. Lobbyists believe the bloc leader is at the point of announcing that the patent bill is the next up for consideration in the Chamber.
Some helpful signs from opposition party ranks
17. Lobbyist Alonso reports that former Foreign Minister Dante Caputo favors a sound law, and haw perhaps 20 Deputies from his party willing to help form a quorum at the time of a floor vote.
Time is right to push harder.
18. With the current ordinary session nearing its end on September 30, Margarinos and local pro-patent lobbyists believe the time is right to push for passage of the bill in the Chamber of Deputies. They see support firming in the Congress with CILFA on the defensive. The association has changed its president at a time when a quality control scandal has rocked local industry.
19. In contacting the Minister of Health again on patents the Ambassador was told that the inability of a local firm to control the quality of one of its elixirs (propolio), which caused the death of more than 20 persons (Buenos Aires 8791), has improved the political environment for patents. Although the firm was not a pharmaceutical lab, the press associated it with that industry and consumer vulnerability to current practices.
20. Most of the multiple competing bills produced by CILFA supporters have attracted little support and can be brushed aside, according to lobbyists. Margarinos also thinks that the number of committees set to review can be reduced.
IDB Conditionality
21. We understand that IDB conditionality for the $350 million investment sector loan (ISL) includes requirements on intellectual property protection as part of the effort to enhance the investment environment. As funds from the ISL are to help with Brady Plan financing and much of the work of the ISL has been completed, the ISL conditionality, as it stands, includes actions which have been taken. For example, on intellectual property rights, it requires in the policy matrix that the GOA: "present to Congress patent legislation that protects pharmaceutical patents." The legislation has, of course, been presented. At an appropriate time, e.g. after the Brady Plan for Argentina is concluded, we may wish to work with the IDB to add pressure on the GOA to comply not only with the letter of the conditionality, but also with the spirit of it which is to establish adequate patent protection for pharmaceuticals so that R and D and other foreign and domestic investment in this field is not discouraged.
American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Ending Patent Legislation Drift," Cable 09529 to the US Secretary of State, September 1992.
American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Pirates Sponsor Deputies' Visit to Washington," Cable 10252 to the US Secretary of State, May 1992.
American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Argentine Patent Law: Visit of Deputy Fescina to Washington" Cable 10002 to the US Secretary of State, May 1992.
September 17th, 1992
American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Putting Patents on Agenda of the Extraordinary Session of Congress," Cable 10084 to the US Secretary of State, September 1992.
September 21st, 1992
American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Talking Points for Eagleburger / Di Tella Meeting," Cable 09913 to the US Secretary of State, September 1992.
September 23rd, 1992
American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Coordination with European Embassies in Support of Patent Bill," Cable 10124 to the US Secretary of State, September 1992.
September 25th, 1992
American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Head of Congressional Foreign Relations Committee Offers Assistance on Patents" Cable 10227 to the US Secretary of State, September 1992.
September 27th, 1992
In his comments in the September 1992 cable, Todman says, "I and Embassy officers continue to work quietly with other embassies, members of the government, and favorably inclined legislators to try to get this issue approved quickly."
American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Patent Legislation," Cable 10206 to the US Secretary of State, May 1992.
Early October, 1992
US Secretary of State, Washington DC, "AU Pharmaceutical Patent Conference," Cable 344829 to the US Embassy in Buenos Aires, October 1992.
An Argentine radio report Ambassador Todman describes as "typical of the way the press is playing the results of the conference" says, in Todman's words, that "the Deputies who had attended the conference left convinced that restricted royalties payment might be acceptable, but unrestricted patents would have an adverse social impact."
American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Request for Results of the AU Conference on Patents," Cable 10252 to the US Secretary of State, October 1992.
November 7th-8th, 1992
President Menem expressed confidence in the ability of Congressmen Jorge Yoma to get the bill passed.
Minister Cavallo said that he expected the bill to pass and warned that overzealous efforts on the part of the international community might backfire. He mentioned the policy conditionality of an Inter-American Development Bank Investment Sector Loan as an example of something that might provoke Congress to angrily and obstinately reject the patent legislation.
Bauza was more skeptical about the bill's prospects, but ultimately promised to push hard for the bill.
American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Ambassador's Discussions with Menem, Cavallo and Bauza on the Patent Law," Cable 11945 to the US Secretary of State, November 1992.
Mid to Late November, 1992
In response to concerns about Argentina's need to improve its research and development capabilities to keep up with current military technology raised by Minister of Defense Erman Gonzalez in a meeting with General Colin Powell, the Ambassador "emphasized the need for the Argentine Congress to pass the administration' patent bill as an important step toward solving this problem."
The Ambassador also met with Minister of Health Julio Cesar Araoz to reinforce his insistence that the Ministry press for the bill's passage.
Ambassador Todman comments in a cable acting US Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger: "We will continue to seek every opportunity to press the issue with Menem administration officials." However, he points out that "the PMA needs to make an additional, much more public effort."
American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Discussion with Cabinet Members on Patents," Cable 12323 to the US Secretary of State, November 1992.
December 1992
In response to a US pharmaceutical industry petition, the United States initiated a Section 301 investigation on patent protection on September 23rd, 1988. On September 23rd, 1989, the pharmaceutical industry withdrew its petition following progress on this issue. Subsequently, Argentina revised its drug registration procedures. In addition, the government of Argentina introduced a new patent law into its Congress on October 11th, 1991 to modernize its existing 1864 patent regime. The law remains in the Argentine legislature where it is under discussion in an extraordinary session. The United States continues to pursue improved intellectual property rights protection in Argentina. Argentina has been placed on the "watch list" under the "Special 301" provision of the 1988 trade act in May 1989 and remains on that list.
US Secretary of State, Washington DC, "Revision of 1992 National Trade Estimate" Cable 402393 to the US Embassy in Buenos Aires, December 1992.
Recently, Alejandro Roemmers, a director of his family's pharmaceutical laboratory, called on the Ambassador seeking support against the GOA's rules for generic drug prescriptions. The Ambassador took the opportunity to press the director on patents, refocusing the conversation on IPR. Roemmers Laboratories is the sales leader in the Argentine market as well as the leader of the domestic Argentine pharmaceutical association fighting improvements in patent protection.Roemmer's reducing desired changes to patent bill
The Ambassador pointed out that sound IPR protection will be one of the top issues for the Clinton Administration. Acknowledging that improved patent protection was inevitable, the director argued for a ten year transition period in Argentina. He pointed out that such a period was currently part of the Dunkel text. At several points in the conversation, the director said that Argentine firms should have "some period" during which the GOA could grant compulsory licenses as part of the transition to a new regime. The director proposed that he and several other "flexible" members of CILFA talk directly with research labs to work out mutually acceptable terms for a law. (CILFA is a local laboratories' trade association.) The Ambassador emphasized the benefits of the Menem Administration's patent bill.
Roemmers preparing for the inevitable.
4. While Roemmers labs is fighting to weaken the Administration's bill, it is also preparing for passage of such a law. The director had just returned from the US, where he discussed possible joint research projects in Argentina with officials from Merck, Sharp, and Dohme as well as Glaxo. Roemmers had already arranged drug (sic) licences with Merck, Glaxo, and Bayer, and talks are underway with SmithKline Beecham. The director estimated that perhaps the top 15 of CILFA's 58 member labs were capable of attracting licensing agreements with foreign patent holders. Roemmers had also contracted Japanese labs. Roemmers had also contracted Japanese labs. However the Japanese were uninterested in licensing with an Argentine firm, preferring to give rights for the hemisphere to US labs.
5. The director was pleased with the results of his talks in the US, but concerned about the short duration of the licensing agreements being discussed. The five year terms under discussion are too short, the director complained. If labs like Roemmers are going to relinquish their free access to front line technology, the director said, longer-term relationships with patent owners are needed. The director suggested that if such agreements were to cover 20 years, this would give his firm sufficient confidence to welcome a patent system. He would like such contracts to establish local labs as the long-term representatives of foreign labs, providing stable access to a stream of new products.
Additional Twist to the Price Argument
6. The director also told the Ambassador local labs would need more freedom of pricing in their contracts. The director complained that Glaxo had insisted Roemmers sell a product at four times its production costs. At such a price, he claimed, the drug would have little sales volume in Argentina. According to the director, Glaxo officials refused to allows the retail price to be more than 15 percent lower in Argentina, because they did not want to have to explain the difference to US consumers. From Glaxo's point of view, the director claimed, the Argentine market was simply too small to allow pricing issues here to endanger margins in major markets elsewhere.
Need to restore a reputation for quality control.
7. The director recognized a need to end at least some of the local industry's free wheeling style of operation. He lamented quality control scandals that rocked local pharmaceutical producers during 1992. Despite Roemmers Labs reputation for quality, it was being hurt by poor standards at other Argentine labs. In the absence of effective GOA regulation, fly-by-night labs have won some of Roemmers' traditional hospital contracts. He reiterated rumors that such labs have sold local hospitals serum which was actually water. These stories along with that of the 22 deaths caused by a tainted elixir had spread to neighboring countries, effecting Roemmers Labs' export sales.
Comment
8. As the leader of the antipatent lobbying effort under the CILFA umbrella, Roemmers is in a strong position to influence the political battle for patent protection in Argentina. Roemmers alone has been willing to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars for such projects as the American University seminar to cement Congressional opposition. While we remain confident our patent protection goal with eventually be obtained, the issues of timing and the actual level of protection that will be passed remain open questions.
9. Turning leading labs like Roemmers around on the issue is a goal now obtainable. The director revealed the changes already underway in the thinking and operational planning at his firm. For instance, Roemmers labs appears to have reduced its demand for compulsory licensing, limiting it to a transition period. Clearly, it is up to PMA to decide whether to continue rejecting Roemmers' offer for direct talks on the contents of a law.
10. Perhaps a more acceptable avenue of fruitful exchange is the request for deeper contractual relations with patent owners. Since the duration of such licensing and contractual relations is outside the scope of a patent law, an accommodation between private firms on this point would not weaken the integrity of the legislation. The impression that the director conveyed is that an amicable agreement on this point could lead to a change in attitude toward the bill and a reduction in the intensity of domestic firms' opposition. Eliminating opposition to the Menem Administration's bill should be an explicit requirement of any extended agreement. This goal can only be pursued by patent holders themselves.
11. One problem is that Roemmers seems to be talking mostly with labs that already have their own reps in Argentina. Other PMA members need to be made aware of the opportunities that a new law will bring so they can consider working our representative arrangements now.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Turning Lead Pirate Labs Around on Patents," Cable 0087 to the US Secretary of State, January 1993.
February 1993
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Explaining USG Policy on IPR," Cable 1621 to the US Secretary of State, February 1993.
Efforts by US pharmaceutical firms have been anemic, yet the pharmaceutical association, PMA, is threatening to recommend Argentina for a Special 301 case should the bill not pass.
See US Secretary of State, Washington DC, "ARA Economic Highlights (January 26-31, 1993)," Cable 37742 to All American Republic Diplomatic Posts, February 1993.
March 3rd, 1993
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Arnet, March 3, on Intellectual Property Rights," Cable 2020 to the US Secretary of State, March 1993.
March 10th, 1993
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Patching Together the Pro-Patent PR Campaign," Cable 2556 to the US Secretary of State, March 1993.
March 18th, 1993
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Patents Get Push From Deputy's Conference," Cable 2799 to the US Secretary of State, March 1993.
March 25th, 1993
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Patent Pirate Leader Visiting Washington," Cable 2851 to the US Secretary of State, March 1993.
April 1993
At the close of his article, Burllich states that invention is no longer as important a source of national wealth as it once was:First, it must be made clear that we are neither constrained by any international obligation nor by any moral or philosophical principle either. In a strict sense a patent is against the natural laws of the market, since it establishes a twenty-year legal monopoly for the benefits of the inventor. The declared objective is to encourage research with the incentive that profits be produced during that period of legal monopoly based on the total exclusion of competition.
Second, practically nothing is invented in Argentina. Less than 0.1% of the patents of the world originate in our country.
Consequently, we do not see the benefits of modifying the current law -- in this aspect, the main argument in favor of the sanction is that the new legislation would encourage research in our country and consequently, technological development. Really, it is not like this because nothing prevents an Argentine inventor from patenting his discovery in developed countries. Besides, the Argentine market, objectively considered, is not big enough to justify the huge expenditure on research and development that any new technology requires.
In the past, the economic victors were those who invented new products. The British of the 19th century and the Americans of the 20th century got rich that way . . . so as to obtain monopolic yields in the technologies of the processes, it was necessary to expel the competitors . . . In the present world inventing a new product is worth very little if the inventor is not the least expensive producer of that product.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Editorial against Patent Reform," Cable 3822 to the US Secretary of State, April 1993.
April 27th, 1993
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "GOA Promises New Effort to Secure Passage of Patent Law," Cable 4015 to the US Secretary of State, April 1993.
May 3rd, 1993
See Nash, Nathaniel C., "US Presses Argentina on Patents," The New York Times, May 2nd, 1993.
June 6th, 1993
See Marx, Gary, "US Prods Argentina on Patents," The Chicago Tribune June 6th, 1993.
June 10th, 1993
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Senate IPR Hearings: Local Labs Presentations," Cable 5748 to the US Secretary of State, June 1993.
June 11th, 1993
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Senate IPR Hearings: Local Labs Presentations," Cable 5748 to the US Secretary of State, June 1993.
Mid-June, 1993
As you know, concurrently with consideration of new patent legislation by the Argentine Congress, the A.I.D. representative's office here has been trying for several months to begin the process of designing a project which would start after, repeat after, the new law is passed. A.I.D, has funds available for this design effort, and I understand PTO has informally expressed its willingness to cooperate with Argentina, subject to USTR concurrence. I am told there has been a decision not to proceed with the design of a project because it was concluded that Argentina should not be quote rewarded with assistance unquote of this type until it had complied with its commitment to pass sound patents legislation, that includes protection for pharmaceutical products.I have no doubt that there will be a new Argentine patents law. It is not a question of whether there will be a better law, but when it will be passed. I believe passage in this year is likely. Obviously, the new law by itself will be of no use until it is implemented. The GOA industrial property office is not capable at this time of implementing even the existing antiquated patent legislation and will certainly be unable to cope with the complexities of a new patent law. The GOA knows this and is anxious to cooperate with PTO. It is in our interest to see that this cooperation begins as soon as possible after new legislation is passed, but this will not happen unless project planning is done now. In addition, the initiation of planning now will signal Argentina that the prospects for collaboration with PTO are indeed real (after a new law is passed) and this signal itself will have a positive impact on deliberations regarding the new law.
Seeing that the GOA passes and implements new patents legislation has long been a top priority to which the USG has devoted great resources and effort. We should do everything possible now to ensure that the potential benefit from a new law will be realized soon after it is passed. I request that steps be taken to have this project approved urgently.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Design of Project for Cooperation Between USDOC Patents and Trademark Office (PTO) and Argentine Industrial Property Office," Cable 5960 to the US Secretary of State, June 1993.
June 17th, 1993
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Patent Hearings - CAEME Gives Best Shot," Cable 6042 to the US Secretary of State, June 1993.
June 28th, 1993
See "Kantor Presses Argentina for a Medical Patents Law," Buenos Aires Herald, June 29th, 1993.
Late June, 1993
July 1st, 1993
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Patent Hearings Continue, with No Clear End in Sight," Cable 6600 to the US Secretary of State, July 1993.
July 29th, 1993
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Patents Hearings Continue, with Weight of Argument Going Against Modern Protection," Cable 7907 to the US Secretary of State, Washington, August 1993.
August 5th, 1993
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Patents Hearings Continue, with Weight of Argument Going Against Modern Protection," Cable 7907 to the US Secretary of State, Washington, August 1993.
August 6th, 1993
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Patents Hearings Continue, with Weight of Argument Going Against Modern Protection," Cable 7907 to the US Secretary of State, Washington, August 1993.
August 9th, 1993
Cannot PMA do better? Are the prices in the chart accurate? If they are, the differences amounting to hundreds and thousands of percent are strong -- and locally very persuasive -- ammunition for those fighting against passage of the patent bill.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Request for Information to Rebut Arguments of Opponents of Patent Law," Cable 7608 to the US Secretary of State, August 1993.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Somos Article on Patents," Cable 7648 to the US Secretary of State, August 1993.
August 11th, 1993
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Patent Law: Ambassador Discusses with Min Econ Cavallo," Cable 7759 to the US Secretary of State, August 1993.
August 12th, 1993
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Patents Hearings Continue, with Weight of Argument Going Against Modern Protection," Cable 7907 to the US Secretary of State, Washington, August 1993.
October 1993
- Alternative I - Regulatory Decree enforcing recently ratified treaties and reinterpreting the old law.
- Alternative II - Exceptional Urgency Decree with force of law
- Alternative III - Amendments of Board of Health regulations
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Patents Outlook Still Uncertain," Cable 10053 to the US Secretary of State, October 1993.
Early November, 1993
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Patents Debate Intensifies," Cable 11010 to the US Secretary of State, November 1993.
November 15th, 1993
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Patent Developments," Cable 11062 to the US Secretary of State, November 1993.
Late November, 1993
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Patent Foes Lash Out in Senate Hearings," Cable 11259 to the US Secretary of State, November 1993.
December, 1993
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "UIA Criticizes Patents Bill," Cable 11568 to the US Secretary of State, November 1993.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Cavallo Praises Patents Bill," Cable 11702 to the US Secretary of State, December 1993.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Talks with PMA Regarding Patent Law," Cable 2007 to the US Secretary of State, March 1994.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Pro-Patents Press Coverage Increases in Wake of Gore Visit," Cable 2105 to the US Secretary of State, March 1994.
March 29th, 1994
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "CILFA, Seeking Dialogue, Calls on Ambassador," Cable 2153 to the US Secretary of State, March 1994.
Early April 1994
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Opposition Senator Backs the TRIPs Text on Patents," Cable 2350 to the US Secretary of State, April 1994.
April 21st, 1994
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "GOA Officials Defend Patent Bill in Senate Testimony," Cable 2693 to the US Secretary of State, April 1994.
May 3rd, 1994
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Senate Passage of Patent Law by June 30?" Cable 2693 to the US Secretary of State, April 1994.
Early to Mid-May 1994
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Patent Lobbying Heats Up," Cable 3068 to the US Secretary of State, May 1994.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "GOA (sic) Consideres Changing Draft Patent Law," Cable 3117 to the US Secretary of State, May 1994.
May 19th, 1994
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Patent Discussion with Opposition Deputies," Cable 3498 to the US Secretary of State, May 1994.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Meetings on Patent Law with Key Ministries and Presidential Chief of Staff," Cable 3422 to the US Secretary of State, May 1994.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Meetings on Patent Law with Key Ministries and Presidential Chief of Staff," Cable 3422 to the US Secretary of State, May 1994.
After years of insistent pressure, we are now in a full scale debating atmosphere . . . in which our side of argument is beginning to appear in press, albeit alongside lies of well-heeled CILFA with its "influential" envelopes. If we don't talk too much about eventual sanctions and continue to focus on the generally positive arguments we have, we may win this battle.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Meetings on Patent Law with Key Ministries and Presidential Chief of Staff," Cable 3422 to the US Secretary of State, May 1994.
June 2nd, 1994
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Cavallo Strongly Defends Modern Patent Protection," Cable 3745 to the US Secretary of State, June 1994.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Press Highlights Cavallo Patent Testimony," Cable 3776 to the US Secretary of State, June 1994
August 1994
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Status of Argentine Patent Law," Cable 5503 to the US Secretary of State, August 1994.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Status of Argentine Patent Law," Cable 5503 to the US Secretary of State, August 1994.
September 1994
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Patents Main Event -- CAEME vs. CILFA" Cable 5865 to the US Secretary of State, September 1994.
October 7th, 1994
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Latest Information on Progress of Patent Law," Cable 6714 to the US Secretary of State, October 1994.
October 13th, 1994
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Ex-President Bush and President Menem Comment on Patent Law in Buenos Aires," Cable 6825 to the US Secretary of State, October 1994.
October 21st, 1994
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Ambassador Raises Patent Law with Cavallo," Cable 7003 to the US Secretary of State, October 1994.
November 8th, 1994
Richardson, Peter C., New York, Letter to Felix Rozanski, Buenos Aires 8 November 1994.
November 22nd, 1994
US Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Min Econ Cavallo Optimistic Problems in Patent Bill Can Be Solved," Cable 7663 to the US Secretary of State, November 1994.
December, 1994
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Pharmaceutical Patenting in Argentina: Open for Business?" Cable 1649 to the US Secretary of State, March 1995.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Chamber of Deputies Moving on Patents?" Cable 8119 to the US Secretary of State, December 1994.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Pharmaceutical Patenting in Argentina: Open for Business?" Cable 1649 to the US Secretary of State, March 1995.
February, 1995
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Status of Draft Patent Legislation," Cable 0691 to the US Secretary of State, February 1995.
March 9th, 1995
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Codel Crane Meeting with FonMin Di Tella," Cable 4921 to the US Secretary of State, August 1995.
March 16th, 1995
March 24th, 1995
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Sec Brown and Min Cavallo Discuss Argentine Financial Situation, Patent Law and NAFTA Enlargement," Cable 1912 to the US Secretary of State, March 1995.
March 29th, 1995
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Chamber of Deputies Passes Patent Law," Cable 1955 to the US Secretary of State, March 1995.
The Chamber declares:Its most energetic repudiation of the declarations made by the Ambassador of the United States in our country, James Cheek, on the deliberations in the National Congress on the patents bill.
It considers them a flagrant violation of the principle of non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, in this case, the Argentine Republic.
Their seriousness is even greater because they are repeated expressions that include open and veiled threats to apply economic and commercial sanctions and reprisals.
The Chamber of Deputies is the representative of the nation's people and, as such, does not accept any form of foreign pressure and interference in the exercise of its functions, as established in Article 75 of the National Constitution.
It would view with satisfaction the use by the national executive power of the attributes conferred by Article 99 (section 11) of the National Constitution, the necessary measures, considering the severity of the case, to prevent a repeat of incidents in this severity.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Chamber of Deputies Passes Patent Law," Cable 1955 to the US Secretary of State, March 1995.
A later article in the Journal of Commerce explains that Ambassador Cheek had decried the new legislation as suitable only for "countries like Suriname or Burundi."
See Journal of Commerce "Argentine Patent Measure Heads for Veto by Menem," 12 April 1995.
April 12th, 1995
See Journal of Commerce "Argentine Patent Measure Heads for Veto by Menem" 12 April 1995.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Fate of Patent Law Still Undecided," Cable 2195 to the US Secretary of State, April 1995.
April 17th, 1995
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Veto of Patent Law," Cable 2291 to the US Secretary of State, April 1995.
April 18th, 1995
In an act of considerable political courage President Menem, on the eve of elections, has effectively vetoed the unacceptable patent law passed by overwhelming majorities of both houses of Congress . . . . This makes GATT/TRIPS patent protection, without any transition period, the law in Argentina, unless, in unlikely event, Congress were to override veto.He subsequently comments:
Embassy worked hard under heavy fire from our formidable opponents to secure full veto. We have achieved this immediate goal. What remains is to nail down GATT/ TRIPs plus."
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Veto of Patent Law," Cable 2291 to the US Secretary of State, April 1995.
Text of veto: see American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Patent Law Veto Decree," Cable 2337 to the US Secretary of State, April 1995.
April 26th, 1995
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Menem Signs Patent Decree," Cable 2451 to the US Secretary of State, April 1995.
April 29th, 1995
See US Secretary of State, Washington DC, "Special 301 Determination - Advance Notice," Cable 103690 to the US Embassy in Buenos Aires, April 1995.
May 2nd, 1995
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Argentine Patent Foes Trying to Rally," Cable 2581 to the US Secretary of State, May 1995.
May 3rd, 1995
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Argentine Patent Foes Trying to Rally," Cable 2581 to the US Secretary of State, May 1995.
May 14th, 1995
See Vilches, Jorge A., "Argentine President's Biggest Challenge is Yet to Come," Wall Street Journal 19 May 1995.
After the passage of TRIPs in 1994 and its (partial) implementation in 1995, the US has a new basis for its arguments in support of Argentine patent rights. The obligations taken on by Argentina, somewhat vague in the text of TRIPs itself, will be fodder for continued conflict between the foreign and Argentine pharmaceutical industries and the two governments during the second Menem Administration.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Reaction to Override of Patent Veto," Cable 2980 to the US Secretary of State, May 1995.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Reaction to Override of Patent Veto," Cable 2980 to the US Secretary of State, May 1995.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Reaction to Override of Patent Veto," Cable 2980 to the US Secretary of State, May 1995.
May 23rd, 1995
May 27th, 1995
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "The New Argentine Cabinet: Containing Rivalries - For Now," Cable 3295 to the US Secretary of State, June 1995.
June 1st-2nd, 1995
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Codel Kolbe and the Patent Issue," Cable 3324 to the US Secretary of State, June 1995.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Codel Kolbe and the Patent Issue," Cable 3324 to the US Secretary of State, June 1995.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Codel Kolbe and the Patent Issue," Cable 3324 to the US Secretary of State, June 1995.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Argentine Deputies Receive Codel Kolbe," Cable 3360 to the US Secretary of State, June 1995.
June 14th, 1995
See Neimeth, Robert, New York, Letter to Warren Christopher, Washington DC, 14 June 1995.
June 21st, 1995
The bill, a second attempt at a compromise after an unsuccessful effort earlier this month, is rejected.
June 20-23rd, 1995
See "Amended IP Law Vote in Argentina?" SCRIP No. 2038, 30 June 1995 p. 19.
July 19th, 1995
Article 36, c: Any person may buy, use, import or in any other way market the patented product or any product obtained by applying the patented process, after such product has been lawfully brought into the market in any country. The bringing into the market shall be considered lawful when it is made in accordance with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Part III, Section IV, of GATT-TRIPs.Article 44: The National Institute of Industrial Property, upon request of the pertinent authority, shall be entitled to set limited exceptions to the rights conferred by a patent. Such exceptions may by no unjustifiable means affect the working of the patent, nor cause unjustified damage to the legitimate interests of the patent holder, taking into account third parties' legitimate interests.
Article 46, last paragraph: Having previously held a hearing with the parties involved and if no agreement is reached, the application authority will establish a reasonable compensation to be received by the patent holder, according to the circumstances of each case, and taking into account the economic value of the authorization and the average royalty rate usually set in the market segment in question for license agreements entered into by independent parties. The decisions concerning the award of such uses must be taken within ninety (90) working days after the application date and the same may not be appealed before the Federal Civil and Commercial Courts. The appeal will not have suspensive effects.
Article 50): Where the use of the subject matter of a patent without the authorization of the patent holder is allowed, the following provisions shall be respected:
- a) The authorization of said uses shall be made by the National Institute of Industrial Property.
- b) The authorization of said uses shall be considered on their individual merits.
- c) For the cases of use considered under Articles 46) and / or 49), prior to the award of such uses, the potential user must have made efforts to obtain authorization from the patent holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions pursuant to Article 46), and such efforts must have been unsuccessful within the period of time stated under Article 45). In the case of public non-commercial use, when the government or contractor, without making a patent search, knows or has demonstrable grounds to know that a valid patent is or will be used by or for the government, the patent holder shall be informed properly.
- d)The authorization shall include patents related to manufacturing processes and components that allow the working thereof;
- e) Such uses shall be non-exclusive;
- f) They shall be non-assignable, except with that part of the enterprise of goodwill which enjoys such use;
- g) They shall be authorized mainly for the supply of the domestic market, with the exception of the cases included under Articles 47) and 48);
- h) The rights holder shall be paid a reasonable remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value of the authorization, following the procedure stated under Article 46); in determining the amount of remuneration in those cases where the uses have been authorized to remedy an anti-competitive practice, the need to correct such practice shall be taken into account, and the termination of the authorization may be refused if it is appreciated that the conditions which led to such authorization are likely to recur;
- i) For uses set under Article 48) and any other unforeseen case, the scope and duration shall be limited to the purposes for which they were authorized, and they shall be subject to termination when the circumstances which led to them cease to exist and are unlikely to recur; the National Institute of Industrial Property shall have the authority to review, upon motivated request, the continued existence of these circumstances. In terminating these uses, the authority shall take into account the legitimate interests of the people who have received the authorization. In the case of semi-conductor technology, the uses without the patent owner's authorization shall only be for public non-commercial use or to remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-competitive.
Article 91) For the purpose of civil proceedings, if the subject matter of a patent is a process for obtaining a product, the judicial authorities shall have the authority, as of January 1, 1999 to order the defendant to prove that the process used to obtain a product is different from the patented process. For the purpose of this judicial authorization, as from that date, and in the absence of proof to the contrary, any identical product produced without the consent of the patent owner shall be deemed to have been obtained by the patented process, always provided that said product is new on that date in accordance with Article 4 above.
Article 94): The National Institute of Industrial Property shall be conducted and managed by a Board of Trustees formed by three (3) members to be appointed by the National Executive Power, one of them upon the proposal submitted by the Ministry of Economy and Public Works and the other member upon the proposal submitted by the Ministry of Public Health and Welfare.
The three members will appoint those Trustees who are to act as President and Vice-President, while the remaining member will only have the capacity of voter in the Board. The members of the Board of Trustees will fill their positions on a full-time basis, with the same incompatibilities and restrictions imposed upon any other public officials in general, and they shall only be removed from their positions through a motivated decision of the National Executive Power.
The Trustees will remain in their positions during a term of FOUR (4) years, and this term may be renewed indefinitely.
An Auditing Board is to be created within the National Institute of Industrial Property for the surveillance of all acts of the different agencies of the Institute.
One Full Syndic and one Alternate Syndic will be in charge of the Board, to be appointed by the Ministry of Economy and Public Works and Services upon the proposal submitted by the National Auditing Agency.
Article 104): Pharmaceutical products inventions shall not be patentable prior to five (5) years as from the date on which the present Law is published in the Official Gazette. Up until that time, none of the articles included in the present Law shall come into force which refer to the patentability of pharmaceutical products or are closely linked to it.
Article 105): Notwithstanding the provision of Article 104 above, patent applications for pharmaceutical products may be filed in the manner and conditions set within the present Law and the same will be granted after five (5) years counted as from the date of publication of this Law in the Official Gazette.
The duration of the patents mentioned herein shall be governed by Article 35 above.
The patent holder will have exclusive right on his invention after five (5) years counted as from the date of publication of this Law in the Official Gazette, except that third parties using the invention without the holder's authorization guarantee the full supply of the domestic market at the same real prices. In such case, the holder shall only be entitled to receive a fair and reasonable compensation from such third parties making use of the same from the date of the patent award until its expiration. If the parties do not reach an agreement, the National Institute of Industrial Property shall set said compensation pursuant to the terms of Article 46 above. What is established in this paragraph will be applicable unless it needs to be modified to fulfill those directives taken by the World Trade Organization in accordance with GATT-TRIPS which are of mandatory fulfillment for the Argentine Republic.
Article 106, paragraph a): The first application was filed within the year prior to the passing of the present Law.
August 1995
See American Embassy, "Swiss Expert Criticizes Argentine patent Bill; Congressional Committee Vote Delayed," Cable 5092 to the US Secretary of State, August 1995.
September, 1995
See US Secretary of State, "Argentine Patent Issues," Cable 219034 to the US Embassy in Buenos Aires, September 1995.
September 28th, 1995
In the context of Argentina this resolution of the impasse between Congress and the President leading to final enactment of medical patent protection is historic, breaking with a tradition of over a century of denying such protection in any form as against the public interest. Nevertheless, the corrective legislation still leaves Argentina's new patent regime short of what we desire and actively seek from the GOA. The GOA well knows this but repeatedly assures us we can expect further improvements to emerge from the implementing regulations the executive will promulgate. We hope the GOA will let us participate in the process of administratively improving its patent regime, as we have requested. In any event, we are compelled to await the implementing regulations before making a final judgment regarding the adequacy of the medical patent protection being afforded us in Argentina and reacting/responding thereto.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Chamber of Deputies Passes Corrective Patent Law," Cable 6094 to the US Secretary of State, September 1995.
October 18th, 1995
The owner of a patent granted in the Argentine Republic shall have the right to prevent third parties from carrying out, without his consent, any acts of manufacture, use offer for sale, sale or importation within his territory of the product and object of the patent, in accordance with the provisions of article 28 of the TRIP's-GATT agreement. For the purposes of the provisions of article 38, paragraph c) of the Law, it shall be understood that a product has been lawfully placed on the market when its introduction thereto has been carried out by the owner of the patent or by a third party with his authorization. In the same way, it shall be understood that an imported product has been lawfully placed on the market within the territory of the Argentine Republic when it has been introduced by the owner of the patent in the country or by a third party with his authorization, or when it has been acquired abroad from the owner of the patent in order to market it in the Argentine Republic, or acquired from a third party authorized to market it in the Argentine Republic.
The owner of the patent shall determine the way in which the actual working of the patent shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of article 27.1 TRIP'S-GATT.Importation shall be considered as working as shall likewise include distribution and marketing in a manner sufficient to meet the demands of the domestic market.
Ambassador Cheek comments in an October 1995 cable to US Secretary of State Warren Christopher:
Having come up short of its goals in the patent corrective text, the GOA has all but rewritten the Congressionally-passed patent law and the corrective version. In doing so, it has given us virtually everything we asked for in a "TRIPs-plus" decree, including what looks suspiciously like de facto patenting immediately for pharmaceuticals through deft handling of market exclusivity.
October 25th, 1995
November 3rd, 1995
US Secretary of State, Washington, "Argentina IPR: Summary of PTO Analysis," Cable 1416 to the US Embassy in Buenos Aires, November 1995.
November 10th, 1995
The review notes:
Argentina has managed to stall the United States for over 4 years and now argues the US should accept a law that will only provide effective protection well into the next century. It seeks to justify this by shifting the goal-posts and asking that the cumulative effect of three patent laws and a regulatory decree be judged against the standards established by GATT TRIPS several years after the Argentine commitments had been made. It would be inconsistent to provide immediate product and pipeline protection while allowing Argentina to fall far short of its commitments.
November 10th, 1995
November 13th, 1995
November 15th, 1995
Ambassador Cheek comments in a November 1995 cable to Secretary of State Warren Christopher:
Ironically, the GOA's decree, pilloried by many in Washington as too weak, is now seriously threatened by Argentine Congress- which considers it too strong. It is now virtually certain that Chamber of Deputies will pass the bill, only question is when.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Argentine Congressional Moves to Nullify GOA Patent Decree," Cable 7219 to the US Secretary of State, November 1995.
December 3rd, 1995
December 7th, 1995
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Chamber of Deputies Passes Bill on Compulsory Licensing," Cable 7781 to the US Secretary of State, December 1995.
December 11th, 1995
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Government Reportedly Decides on Total Veto of Latest Patent Law," Cable 7759 to the US Secretary of State, December 1995.
December 12th, 1995
See World Intellectual Property Review Volume 11, Number 1.
December 15th, 1995
December 22nd, 1995
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, Cable to the US Secretary of State, Washington DC, December 1995.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Menem Partially Vetoing Patent Bill," Cable 0031 to the US Secretary of State, Washington DC, January 1996.
"Effective Patent Protection is Needed Now in Argentina, PhRMA Says," PhRMA 2 January 1996.
January 3rd, 1996
January 4th, 1996
See US Secretary of State, Washington, "A/S Watson's 1/4 Meeting with Argentine Economy Minister Cavallo," Cable 5182 to the US Embassy in Buenos Aires, January 1996.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Another Argentine Patent Regulatory Decree?" Cable 0119 to the US Secretary of State, January 1996.
January 6th, 1996
January 17th, 1996
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Update on Data Exclusivity," Cable 0271 to the US Secretary of State, 1996.
February, 1996
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Argentine Patent Fight: The View from Merck," Cable 0885 to the US Secretary of State, February 1996.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Argentine Pharmaceutical Firms Changing Their Spots?" Cable 0980 to the US Secretary of State, February 1996.
February 20th, 1996
February 23rd-28th, 1996
The legal and economic defense of the Argentine Congress's patent law of March 1995, and its subsequent corrective text, are based on arguments developed by the association of local labs, CILFA, which boasts some 60 member firms. CILFA claims to support a patent system that provides "a balance between private interests and public welfare," including "the right of the Argentine people to obtain medicine at reasonable prices." With this official philosophy, CILFA firms (and others aligned with the smaller local association COOPERLA) have, for decades, vigorously copied international firms' patented products. In the process, local firms control around 54 percent of the Argentine pharmaceutical market, said to be the twelfth largest in the world with annual turnover of more than three billion dollars.As such, the Argentine Congress passed patent legislation intended, as much as anything else, to defend the interests of local pharmaceutical firms. At the same time, supporters of this legislation in Congress claim the law is consistent with TRIPs. In Washington, Argentine Congressmen are likely to argue that, with corrective text, the law is TRIPs-consistent because it allows importation as legitimate patent exploitation. They may also claim that the law's compulsory licensing regime, including stipulation that license can be issued to alleviate "excessive prices vis-a-vis the market average" is also legal because TRIPs article 31(k) authorizes licenses to remedy "anti-competitive" practices. The Congressmen may note that pipeline protection, demanded by the US, is not required by TRIPs. They might also argue that TRIPs allows parallel imports, since article 6 stipulates that the agreement does not address the issue of exhaustion.
Congress has strongly defended the five-year transition for pharmaceutical patenting, arguing that Argentina, as a developing country, requires an adjustment period, in addition to noting that five-year transition contained in the law complies with TRIPs (which allows up to 10 years). Congressmen may also point out that other countries have enjoyed transition periods. According to CILFA, these include Austria with eight years, Portugal with five, Spain and Greece with six years and Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Norway, each with 10 years. However, CILFA never mentions that Argentina's two leading labs have over 100 patents registered or applied for abroad, primarily in Europe but also in the US, Canada, and Japan.
Probably the most effective argument in swaying Argentine public opinion in the CILFA/Congressional repertory centers on prices. Under "monopolistic" patenting (i.e. without easy compulsory licensing), CILFA has claimed, the price of medicines in Argentina will skyrocket by 273 percent, approximating US levels, although no time frame is given for this increase. To "prove" this, CILFA has published comparisons of prices of pharmaceuticals in Argentina to the US, where "monopoly" is said to reign. (Both CILFA and Congress contend that the patent system is responsible for the "health crisis" in the US. One local company president recently told ECONOFF even though health care reform had recently failed in the US, in his opinion "the American people would successfully demand overhaul of the patent system within 10 years.")In some cases the supposed price differentials are as high as several hundred percent. As a result, according to CILFA, with patenting consumption of pharmaceuticals in Argentina would decrease by 45 percent. However, a recent study published by the Fundacion Mediterranea, a highly respected local think tank with links to economy minister Cavallo, disputed CILFA's claim. Fundacion calculated a price hike for patented products of 71 percent, translating into an overall rise in pharmaceuticals (patented and non-patented) of 21 percent, using CILFA's assertion that patented medicines would account for 30 percent of the Argentine market. Using pro-IPR lobby CAEME's base of 10 percent as patented products, the overall price increase would be 10 percent. Again, no time line was presented.
In countering CILFA's argument, it should also be noted that the association only compares the prices of products still under patent in the US with the local equivalent, copied or original. Representatives of international labs have countered with data showing that at least some patented products are cheaper in the US. CILFA also ignores the fact that many, if not most, non-patented US products (generic or trademark) including such medicine cabinet mainstays as Motrin, Tylenol, Imodium or simple aspirin, are cheaper in the US than in Argentina. Furthermore, the prices of original products in Argentina in many, if not most cases, are lower than their copied counterparts. In response, CILFA claims "competition," which would be absent with patenting, forces the innovative firms to keep their prices low.
Balance of Payments Impact
Related to pricing are balance of payments effects. According to CILFA, barring parallel imports, patent holders will force Argentina to import higher priced pharmaceutical raw materials. CILFA claims that Italy went from a trade surplus of around 50 million dollars before pharmaceutical patenting in 1978 to a deficit of several hundred million dollars by 1990. In the process, the price of pharmaceuticals in Italy rose by 200 percent. (Note: CAEME countered this by noting the overall inflation rate in Italy was higher.) CILFA and the Congress also claim that royalty payments to foreign patent holders will also impact on the balance of payments. All told, higher imports and royalty payments would supposedly translate into 367 million dollars transferred abroad. As such, in many local minds, conferring patent protection is a trade concession to the US without receiving anything comparable in return. At the same time, Argentine Congressmen habitually slam the US and to a lesser extent the EU on agricultural subsidies, which allegedly "rob" Argentina of its "natural" export markets.
Denying the Benefits
CILFA and Congress habitually deny the link between patents and innovation. Instead, they claim a country's level of development determines its level of inventiveness. They point to the disproportionate share of inventions originating in industrialized countries such as the US, Germany, Japan, etc. CILFA spokesman Pablo Challu goes even further, claiming that patents stifle inventiveness. Reason: by conferring exclusive marketing rights, an inventor with a mediocre product is shielded from competition. Without a monopoly, the patentee would be forced to invent better products.
CILFA's literature also downplays the amount of investment in research and development generated by patent protection, particularly in lesser-developed countries. CILFA claims R and D will remain centered in the developed world, in the Northern hemisphere, which will be content merely to export its patented products, as opposed to investing in local production. (One local pharmaceutical firm president told ECONOFF "not even Australia" has received significant research and development investment), since it is a small country and far from major markets. ECONOFF countered with information provided by Pharma and Merck showing a significant increase in R and D in Australia after its patent law of 1990 came into effect.) CILFA argues this leads to disinvestment, a la Chile, where several international firms shut down their plants after the new patent law of 1991, replacing them with sales offices, resulting in higher unemployment. CILFA also claims that Canada's pharmaceutical sector has lost over 1800 jobs since 1993 when the new patent law was enacted "under pressure form the US," although this was attributed to mergers and downsizing. Yet, CILFA asserts that the market share of foreign firms invariably increases with patenting, because their exports will force local labs (which presumably made their living previously by infringement) to shut down.
Comment
CILFA pulled out all the stops in lobbying for weak patent protection and succeeded brilliantly with Congress. The passage of TRIPs, with its stipulation that imports count as patent exploitation, helped to prevent passage of an even weaker law.
Argentine Congressmen will now travel to Washington intending to convince the US, and the Argentine public, that the law is TRIPs-consistent, and that the US government should cease pressuring for more. The delegation is bringing its own press corps (four to five journalists, including representatives of the leading daily Clarin, left of center Pagina 12 and news service DYN) to Washington to send their version of the truth back home. Hard-line Deputy Humberto Roggero traveled early, "to scout the turf," according to the local press. We suspect he conferred with CILFA's public relations firm in Washington to sharpen its arguments.
Washington interlocutors can expect Roggero and his fellows to be dressed for bear, ready to use the Argentine press and to push their message from a prestigious perch in Washington. We should be prepared to counter their arguments directly and forcefully, both in private and before the visiting Argentine journalists, by emphasizing the benefits to Argentina of strong IPR protection, rather than the sanctions under consideration by the US government.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Argentine Congress' Patent Arguments," Cable 1111 to the US Secretary of State, February 1996.
You should send a firm message that the present regime is unacceptable to us and that it is causing our industry serious harm. You should emphasize that this is a point of view shared throughout the USG. I also recommend that you speak to Argentina's place in the global economy and the essential role strong patent protection plays.The memorandum concludes: "You avoid being drawn into a discussion of whether the Argentine regime satisfies TRIPs or not. We have made clear that we expect TRIPs-plus protection and have laid down specific benchmarks for adequate protection.
February 29th, 1996
With regard to the pharmaceutical patents issue, Secretary Christopher warns that the US may soon enact trade sanctions against Argentina. Minister Di Tella responds that the executive branch is engaged in a dispute with Congress, but has succeeded in obtaining the passage of legislation that, as Secretary Christopher paraphrased in a later cable, "would be GATT-consistent with a few additional 'pluses.'" Secretary Christopher notes, "While there would be fewer 'pluses' than the US might want, Di Tella urged the US to be understanding and not to take retaliatory measures."
See US Secretary of State, Washington DC, Cable to the American Embassy in Buenos Aires, March 1996.
See US Secretary of State, Washington DC, "Secretary's February 29 Meeting with Argentine FM Guido Di Tella, Palacio San Martin, Buenos Aires," Cable 48875 to the US Embassy in Buenos Aires.
Early to Mid-March, 1996
The GOA is seeking to clarify the prohibition against parallel imports and confine them to instances in which a compulsory license has been issued. Compulsory licenses would be circumscribed at least somewhat by restricting invocation of 150 day negotiating deadline to instances of non-working of patent. GOA is also trying to maintain its version of "limited pipeline" (TRIPs Article 70.4) in new decree. Nevertheless, the situation is fluid with Congressional opposition still strong, particularly in the Senate. Congress has also hinted it would add a local working requirement, a la Brazil. The final result could well be "TRIPs minus."
Cheek paraphrases Garcia Lema as saying that "the GOA is trying to maintain, or even improve, 'positive elements' contained in Decree 590, which Congress has tried to derogate, while ceding on minor, 'symbolic' issues." Pulles is quoted as saying that the Decree provision that any pirated drugs in the market in 2000, when patenting begins, must be withdrawn constitutes a "limited form of pipeline." Cheek paraphrases Pulles as continuing on to say that "the five year transition was more myth than reality."
The cable also reports that an Embassy economic section official met with Pulles and Robert Sherwood, a "visiting IPR expert" sponsored by the US Embassy. With regard to the compulsory licensing bill passed by the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, Ambassador Cheek paraphrases the Embassy official as demanding that "GOA either try to kill the bill in the Senate or veto it should it pass." Pulles agrees.
Pulles points out the lack of consistency in US pressures on intellectual property regulations by noting the precedent created by Brazil's Bezerra Bill, which imposes a local working requirement. Ambassador Cheek reports that "Pulles said some Congressmen, particularly those who recently consulted with the USG in Washington, were threatening to add a local working clause to counter the perceived advantage that article gave Brazil in attracting investment."
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "GOA Readout on Patent Negotiations," Cable 1587 to the US Secretary of State, March 1996.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "US Takeover of Argentine Pharmaceutical Company," Cable 1702 to the US Secretary of State, March 1996.
March 14th, 1996
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "GOA / Congress Agree on New Patent Decree" Cable 1610 to the US Secretary of State, Washington DC, March 1996.
March 20th, 1996
Tempers exploded over US patent rights at the hemispheric trade summit on Wednesday, prompting organizers to summon police to calm unruly South American drug company representatives."There were boos. There were charges of manipulation" said Harvey E. Bale Jr., a senior vice president of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America. "It was the most violent meeting I ever attended."
The disruption -- where the violence was only verbal-- was over what US drug companies call piracy, but which some South American companies say is greed by US drugmakers.
"They want a law that only benefits them," protested Pablo Maron Challu, executive director of CILFA, which represents Argentine drug companies.
He said drug makers operating in 14 countries including Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Colombia oppose the strict patent regulations demanded by the US drug and publishing industries.
Industrial countries should be more generous in sharing technology with the developing world, he said.
Summit coordinator Jorge Ramirez Ocampo had to personally intervene to get the working group to include the dissenting opinion in its final report, one of 13 being presented to trade ministers on Wednesday.
Bale said the issues are actually quite simple: the Argentina-centered pharmaceutical "pirates" want to be able to continue producing heart drugs, antibiotics, anti-ulcerants and other medications based on US-developed products whose patents are still pending.
They also want their governments to be able to oblige multinational companies like Pfizer, Merck, and Squibb, which Bale represents, to license drugs to domestic producers at low royalty rates, he said.
The trade ministers, including US Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, will meet behind closed doors on Thursday to work out a final communique.
"Tempers Flare at Trade Summit," AP Online, 20 March 1996.
Congressional reaction to the decree, as reported in the local papers, is mixed. Ambassador Cheek reports in a March 1996 cable to the US Secretary of State:
Local press has reported that Congressional leaders disagree with the decree's stipulations on transition and compulsory licensing. They contend that copied pharmaceutical products introduced during the transition period should not be excluded from the market after 2000, and that 150 day negotiating deadline for compulsory license should apply not only in cases of non-working but in all cases in which local company seeks a license. (Press reported some Congressmen want to resolve these issues in court.) Nevertheless, hardline Congressman Humberto Roggero was quoted in business daily "El Cronista" saying that while the decree "was not ideal, we're satisfied.
American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "New Argentine Patent Decree Issued," Cable 1769 to the US Secretary of State, March 1996.
March 21st, 1996
American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Draft Data Exclusivity Law Submitted to Congress," Cable 1795 to the US Secretary of State, March 1996.
March 28th, 1996
April 10th, 1996
April, 1996
Ambassador Cheek comments: "putting these issues in a more global context advanced our arguments while reaffirming US diplomatic and commercial interests."
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Visit of Codel Moorhead to Buenos Aires: Keeping Patents on the Agenda," Cable 2296 to the US Secretary of State, April 1996.
Late April, 1996
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Local Working Requirement to be added to Argentine Patent Law?" Cable 2624 to the US Secretary of State, April 1996.
April 25th, 1996
See Maggs, John, "Four Countries Face Sanctions for Copyright, Patent Violations," Journal of Commerce 25 April 1996.
April 30th, 1996
The failure of the Argentine Congress to pass a strong patent law imposes economic costs on both of our countries. It reduces Argentina's ability to attract foreign investment and the competitiveness of Argentine companies in global markets. And here at home, I am concerned about the damage that the lack of effective patent protection in Argentina is causing to US companies and workers.The US does not impose trade sanctions because, as President Clinton writes, it expects that the Argentine administration will "continue to work with the Argentine Congress to improve intellectual property."
Clinton, William J., Washington DC, Letter to Carlos Menem, Buenos Aires, 30 April 1996.
May 3rd, 1996
By the look of things, the combination of Brazil's new patent law and President Clinton's letter (sic) have turned Menem -- who just last month told CODELs Moorhead and Burton that the Argentine law was TRIPs-consistent and, because of near-unanimous Congressional opposition, could not be changed.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Menem Says Patent Law to be Revisited," Cable 2728 to the US Secretary of State, May 1996.
May 9th, 1996
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Status of Argentine Draft Data Exclusivity Law," Cable 2905 to the US Secretary of State, Washington DC, May 1996.
May 23rd-24th, 1996
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Argentines Propose Mercosur Patent Working Requirement," Cable 3348 to the US Secretary of State, May 1996.
June, 1996
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Patents: Argentine Labs Ready to Deal?" Cable 3601 to the US Secretary of State, 1996.
June 12th, 1996
June 19-20, 1996
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Conclusions of Symposium on Integration and Intellectual Property Rights," Cable 4226 to the US Secretary of State, July 1996.
July 16th, 1996
To be sure, CILFA may not see eye-to-eye with those who advocate strict, monopoly-patent systems which excess the international intellectual property agreements such as trips. But that does not justify their exclusion from a "hemispheric" conference. We would ask that the US government either make efforts to include Argentine interests such as CILFA in the future, or refrain from calling US government events meetings "of the Americas."
Barberis, Edgardo A. and Paraida, Jose M., Buenos Aires, Letter to Mickey Kantor, Washington DC, 16 July 1996.
See Warner-Lambert Company, "Exclusive Marketing Rights for Lipitor in Argentina," 14 December 1999.
July 26th, 1996
August 1st, 1996
September 20th, 1996
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Resignation of Under Secretary Tombeur," Cable 5756 to the US Secretary of State, September 1996.
September 24th-26th, 1996
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "ITC Commissioner's Remarks on Pharmaceutical Patents," Cable 5909 to the US Secretary of State, September 1996.
October 4th, 1996
Both Mrs. Spero and I share your concern over the lack of protection for pharmaceutical products in Argentina and its continuing impact on US industry. The Argentine patent system falls far short of providing adequate and effective protection. We continue to press the Argentine government on this issue through high level dialogue, Special 301, and the day to day activities of the US Embassy in Buenos Aires.Samuel then promises that "the views of the US pharmaceutical industry will play an important role in the conduct of this review" and assures the Merck executives that he and Mrs. Spero "look forward to working with you to further the interests of our pharmaceutical industry in Argentina."
See Samuel, E. Bryan, Washington DC, Letter to Grey F. Warner and J. Anthony Imler, Whitehouse Station, New Jersey.
Week of October 10th, 1996
The daily said congressional reaction to the data exclusivity bill has been negative. One unidentified congressional source acknowledged that Argentina is required to protect such data under TRIPS, but said that "as written, the GOA's bill is a new patent law thought up by the US and its lobbies." The source said, "The secrecy law is necessary, but not at the price, again, that the White House wants us to pay." In its lead editorial of the same day, "La Nation" noted that the enactment of Argentina's new patent regime only came after three years of constant threats by the US to impose economic sanctions.
All articles quoted or paraphrased in American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Argentina: Prospects for Improvement in Pharmaceutical Patent Protection," Cable 6356 to the US Secretary of State, Washington DC, October 1996
October 15th, 1996
BrazilArgentina
- Brazil certainly provided a positive example for the rest of the hemisphere with the approval of the new patent and trademark law in April.
- We are urging Brazil to resolve our concerns about the TRIPs-inconsistent local working requirement in the patent law. In your view, what are the prospects for a successful resolution of this issue? Do you have any ideas regarding US strategy? What would be the implications for your company and the US industry if it is not resolved?
Mercosur
- In a recent meeting with Argentine Minister of Economy Roque Fernandez and Chief of Cabinet Jorge Rodriguez, I made clear our continued disappointment with the patent law and implementing regulations enacted by the Argentine Congress.
- I urged the GOA to enact legislation to protect test data submitted for regulatory approval (data exclusivity) but made clear that all of our other longstanding issues also must be addressed.
- I also cautioned that Argentina should resist efforts to establish "working requirements" in the patent law similar to the provisions in the new Brazilian law. The Argentines replied that reopening the patent issue in Congress would almost certainly result in a working requirement.
- Frankly, it appears that the Argentine position on this issue is hardening, potentially putting our two countries on a potential collision course as the December 1 deadline for completion of the Special 301 out-of-cycle review approaches.
- We will be carefully examining our options in the context of the review. If you have any new ideas about how to move the Argentines forward on this issue we are eager to hear them.
- We noted a recent press report that Bristol Myers Squibb has purchased an Argentine "pirate" company with the intention of rectifying its practices and using the company as a base for market development. Do you see a trend developing along these lines?
- We have heard that Mercosur may be considering development of a common IPR regime. Do you have any information on the timing and content of this?
October 21st, 1996
October 25th, 1996
See La Nacion "Menem Affirmed that there are Guarantees for Investment in the Country." 25 October 1996.
October 29th-30th, 1996
At this time we are exploring various alternatives to address this longstanding issue. All USG agencies share a commitment to two major objectives: (1) to obtain patent protection in Argentina and (2) to create disincentives for other countries to follow in Argentina's footsteps. We understand that these two goals may suggest conflicting approaches and we might not achieve both, at least in the short run.With these goals in mind, we would be interested in obtaining Post's views on a number of issues.
First, what action would Post suggest as a result of the OCR? This includes not only thoughts on Special 301 designation, but appropriate complementary actions, if any. In this regard, the question of whether Menem has gone as far as he can politically to obtain better patent protection is of interest. [PhRMA argues that he has not done everything he could politically, citing the unanimous rejection of the patent decree (after he was overwhelmingly re-elected) as a signal that he lacked the political will to institute this protection.]
Second, what other measures could be pursued to achieve our goals? In this regard, we have been exploring other avenues that continue to remind the GOA that the failure to provide patent protection affects it in ways more than placement on a Special 301 list. Basically, the question is whether actions could be packaged to strengthen the message that patent protection for pharmaceuticals is not only a priority for the US industry, but should also be a priority for the Argentine Congress and Executive branches and the Argentine population in general. We are looking to identify constituencies that might benefit from those reforms that pirate pharmaceutical manufacturers oppose. This might be the scientific community, the high tech community, the agricultural community, or others. We would like to explore whether leverage in areas previously not explored provide allies not yet identified to pressure the GOA on this issue.
Additionally, we still are reviewing the timeline Post provided to assess whether the current Argentine law is TRIPs-consistent or has a "stand-still" violation of TRIPs, raising the option of a WTO case.
PhRMA has told us that their representatives in Argentina want even stronger action taken than the Washington office has been pushing. Any input on the local representatives views on the OCR would assist us during this process.
Finally, we understand that any GOA action to improve patent protection likely will meet stiff resistance from pirate pharmaceutical firms and their allies that benefit from the current situation. Thinking ahead, we question what these firms plan to do in year 2000 when Argentina is required to adhere to TRIPs. Any thoughts on what might persuade these firms to move into the legitimate market now or what could hinder their current activities would be welcome.
November 7th, 1996
See US Secretary of State, Washington DC, "Discussion with GOA Officials on IPR Issues," Cable 241292 to the US Embassy in Buenos Aires, November 1996.
November 20th-21st, 1996
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Prospects for Acceptable Data Exclusivity Law Fade," Cable 6996 to the US Secretary of State, November 1996.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Prospects for Acceptable Data Exclusivity Law Fade," Cable 6996 to the US Secretary of State, November 1996.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Prospects for Acceptable Data Exclusivity Law Fade," Cable 6996 to the US Secretary of State, November 1996.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Presidential Counselor McLarty's November 21 Meeting with Minister of Economy Fernandez," Cable 7018 to the US Secretary of State, November 1996.
Ambassador Cheek, who attended the lunch meeting between McLarty and Di Tella, summarizes their discussion of intellectual property rights as follows in a subsequent cable:
12. Turning to intellectual property issues at McLarty's request, di Tella said the GOA should be given credit for legislation Argentina has already passed. Legislation on data exclusivity would also be disposed of quickly, di Tella predicted. Reiterating the point from his earlier meeting with Menem, McLarty said IPR issues are "critically important" to the United States. While we understand the difficulties the GOA has had domestically on this issue, US industry has lost untold sums to Argentine pirates and the issue is also highly charged in the United States. Even if the confidentiality law referred to by di Tella passes, however, that won't necessarily be sufficient for the USG and for US industry. Speaking as a true friend of Argentina, McLarty commented, we need to be clear on this point.13. Di Tella said, "If you take away our access to GSP, that would be a problem, but not the end of the world." Ambassador Cheek noted the point may turn out to be moot, because of the lower "graduation level" of per capita GDP which the new legislation establishes for GSP participation. If, as appears likely, Argentina falls above this lowered level, it would lose its GSP privileges even with perfect IPR protection. Di Tella seized on the symbolism of such a move. Who would believe we have a "special relationship" with you, he asked rhetorically, if you take actions against us no matter what we do? With some exasperation, he asked if there was anything Argentina could do which would actually satisfy US concerns on intellectual property.
14. McLarty suggested that as a first step, Argentina should pass a strong data exclusivity law. USTR would then evaluate the new regime in time for the upcoming meeting of the two Presidents in December, assuming the Argentine legislature acted immediately. The issue could thus be "teed up" for our leaders to decide the next steps. Di Tella said the GOA is not interested in solving the IPR issue in order to placate the United States. Rather, fashioning world class IPR protections would be good for Argentina, even critical if that country is to successfully join the first world economic system. But the United States must be reasonable and realistic, he said.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Luncheon Meeting of Presidential Counselor McLarty and Foreign Minister Di Tella," Cable 7440 to the US Secretary of State, December 1996.
November 27th, 1996
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Congressional Activity on Improved Data Exclusivity Bill," Cable 7132 to the US Secretary of State, December 1996.
Early December, 1996
Larry, given everything else going on I doubt your office has reviewed the USTR proposal on the OCR. Our initial feeling in EB is that we support it. If you have any thoughts, I would appreciate an update. However, as I doubt that we will reach agreement, I will begin to draft a split decision memo for Mrs. Spero. When your position becomes clearer, we can insert the paragraph that describes your office's position. Mrs. Spero will be out Dec. 13, but at this time is expected to be in town until the Xmas week. Please let me know how this issue is moving in your office. Thanks. Susan.See Schmidt, Susan M., "OCR Decision on Argentina," email, 29 November 1999.
Susan et al - Bryan Samuel and I discussed Argentina IPR in general tuesday night. BS said Dobbins at NSC continues to push Davidow to "just say no" on any sanctions. Bryan and PDAS Romero are telling Davidow that won't wash. BS thought McLarty had been educated and would be "better" on the issue this year. Bryan said his own view at this point was that we would have to hit Argentina with at least half of its GSP. Wondered aloud if we shouldn't just take away all of the GSP benefits at one time in December. Get it all over with. Sees little chance that Arg will be able to do anything for us so why set up unrealistic expectations that they'll move by Spring. If, by some miracle, they do improve, we could give them back some of their GSP but that's a longshot. Bryan was vague on PFC designation. Later asked if we could set some "realistic" benchmarks short of what industry wants as interim steps we think Argentina would have a chance of accomplishing by Spring. We agreed we'd see how the Menem 15 minute courtesy call with Clinton goes plus the Secretary / DeTello meeting. Then try to do some sort of a paper for Joan to get a State position.See Donnelly, Shaun, "Argentina IPR," email to Susan Schmidt, 3 December 1999.Shaun
Diance, Bill C, Mary Jo, Robin, Tony, Tim
PS - These musings from Bryan are interesting but may not materialize into ARA's formal position when we have to get something down on paper.
December, 1996
1. SUMMARY
2. "Priority Foreign Country" (PFC) designation of Argentina, leading to imposition of sanctions would not advance our IPR agenda but would jeopardize key US economic, political, and strategic interests. Instead, an aggressive and sustained medium term strategy should include: immediate US pressure in multilateral fora such as the WTO and the FTAA process, steps to encourage the EU and selected European countries to push Argentina on this issue, technical assistance to Argentina's National Institute for Intellectual Property and to its judiciary, and support for a serious industry-led public campaign making the case for patent protection to the Argentine public. The challenge to US foreign policy in dealing with this highly contentious issue is to artfully manage it in a way that both keeps the pressure on the GOA for more progress and avoids damage to our substantial economic and commercial interests in Argentina and injury to our very special relationship with the GOA. We believe that the measures recommended herein will do just that. END SUMMARY.
3. As requested by Department and USTR, this message provides Embassy's views for the December Special 301 out of cycle review (OCR) of pharmaceutical patents in Argentina. Ambassador will provide additional thoughts septel.
POLITICAL COMMITMENT OF THE MENEM ADMINISTRATION
4. The major obstacle to improved IPR protection for the pharmaceutical industry is a strong pirate-financed and led anti-IPR lobby in the Argentine Congress -- not lack of political will on the part of the Menem Administration. Over the last three years President Menem has spent substantial political capital in a protracted tug of war with Congress over this issue (BA 5296) He has repeatedly used his line item veto and decree powers to provide patent protection for pharmaceuticals consistent with our demands, only to see these actions subsequently overridden by unanimous Congressional votes. Menem also vetoed legislation which adversely impacted IPR protection for pharmaceuticals. The resulting political standoff between the legislative and executive branches led to the negotiated March 1996 compromise decree which established Argentina's current, inadequate (to our demands) patent regime.
STRONG DOMESTIC PIRATE INDUSTRY
5. The strong Congressional opposition to IPR protection for pharmaceuticals reflects the power of a well-entrenched, highly profitable, very sophisticated pirate industry committed to delaying patent protection for as long as possible. PhRMA estimates that in 1995 local firms accounted for 55 percent of total pharmaceutical sales of USD 3.6 billion in Argentina. The two leading pirate firms -- Roemmers and Bago -- had sales of USD 263 and USD 242 million respectively. The sector, which consists of more than twelve pirate firms, is well-organized, well-financed and has devoted substantial resources to combating IPR protection. Its industry organization -- CILFA -- has hired public relations firms in Argentina and the US to successfully portray the patent issue as a unilateral US effort to obtain huge monopolistic profits for US firms. Pirate executives hold key posts in major Argentine business groups and make large contributions to charity. They also have close ties with key Congressional figures, such as Chamber of Deputies Industry Committee chairman Roggero.
6. In addition to their successful efforts to torpedo or delay IPR protection, pirate firms have also begun to prepare to operate in the November 2000 environment. Pirate firms have stated their intention to invest USD 750 million over the next five years to develop their research and production capacity. At the same time, they stress that the transition period is crucial to their efforts to compete with multinational companies. Pirate firms have also signed, or are negotiating, strategic alliances with major multinational companies. These deals combine the pirates' marketing networks with the MNC's product pipelines. CILFA also recently began to cooperate with CAEME -- the MNC industry association -- on issues of mutual interest such as generics. Lastly, pirate firms are working to place individuals sympathetic to their interests in the judiciary and key regulatory agencies.
MOBILIZING CONSTITUENCIES
7. The US has made a concerted effort over the past ten years to develop a broad constituency in support of improved patent protection for pharmaceuticals. Drawing on presentations prepared by the Embassy, a parade of senior US visitors -- including seven cabinet members -- have repeatedly and publicly stressed the benefits which will accrue to Argentine consumers from patent protection. In addition, numerous US officials and US sponsored speakers have participated in IPR conferences and seminars. The Embassy also regularly distributes information about the positive impact of IPR protection in other countries to the media and key decision-makers. These efforts have been in partnership with PhRMA, its member firms and their local representatives (CAEME), and occasionally European firms.
8. Despite these sustained efforts, no broad constituency or politically potent lobby in favor of patent protection has emerged. Within the MNC pharmaceutical community, European firms -- which control 30 percent of the Argentine market -- have chosen not to actively push the Argentine government on this issue. Hence, the EU and individual European governments have not backed US efforts. Lack of European support has also hindered CAEME's ability to mount a sustained campaign for IPR protection. Personal and institutional rivalries within the local MNC pharmaceutical community have further weakened CAEME's lobbying campaign.
9. Similarly, active attempts to engage sectors outside the pharmaceutical community have met with little success. Members of the Argentine scientific community show some sympathy, but lack the political clout and will to take on the pirate lobby and significantly influence the debate. The high tech community cooperates with the MNC pharmaceutical industry on broad IPR concerns, but has resisted becoming identified with the highly contentious pharmaceutical patent issue. (FYI: local representatives of a major software firm have confided to use their main fear is that opponents of a bit making criminal sanctions applicable to cases of software piracy will link that legislation to pharmaceuticals and drag them into the continuing pharmaceuticals fray.) Our efforts to obtain the agrochemical industry's support on the data exclusivity bill were undercut when Congress authorized the Argentine Institute of Vegetable Health and Quality to develop its own regulatory scheme outside of the proposed bill.
PRIORITY FOREIGN COUNTRY DESIGNATION AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
10. We believe that, with or without passage of a data exclusivity bill, designation of Argentina as a "priority foreign country" under "special" Section 301 or the imposition of economic sanctions is unwarranted at this time. A PFC designation would not achieve the desired changes in Argentina's pharmaceutical patent regime. In fact, it would likely have the perverse effect of undercutting the pro-IPR executive while further strengthening and hardening Congressional opposition. Furthermore, a PFC designation would seriously jeopardize a wide range of key US economic and political interests, while failing to recognize that with the exception of pharmaceutical patents, Argentina has a good record on IPR protection.
11. Designation of Argentina as a PFC would require USTR to launch a formal investigation to determine if Argentina's pharmaceutical patent regime is "actionable" under Section 301 and whether trade sanctions are an appropriate response. Announcement of such an investigation would be a blow to Menem's pro-US foreign policy, and would damage his presently sagging domestic political standing (Ref C). It would provoke a nationalistic backlash in Congress -- especially since the investigation would occur during the run-up to the October 1997 Congressional elections -- and would provide a new and easy opening for those currently pressing to insert a local production requirement in the current patent regime to conform to that of Brazil.
12. While not advancing our goal of improving Argentina's patent regime, a PFC designation would endanger a wide range of US economic and political interests. In the economic area, Argentina has made clear its intent to respond appropriately if the US imposes sanctions because of the pharmaceutical patents issue, although its WTO consistent options are limited (as are ours). Argentine retaliation could endanger the roughly USD 2.5 billion trade surplus which the US will run with Argentina in 1996. It could also impact negatively on lucrative direct US investment in the country, currently standing at over USD 8 billion and increasing by USD two billion annually. Our large trade surplus and direct investments are big targets of opportunity: it would be naive to expect them to escape unharmed from a sanctions war.
13. The PFC designation and the prospect of trade sanctions would come at a moment when the US is looking to Argentina to support efforts to revive the FTAA process. Sanctioning Argentina for its failure to fulfill commitments which exceed its WTO obligations would dampen Argentine interest and enthusiasm for backing important long-term US trade goals in the FTAA, Mercosur, and the WTO. It would also set a bad example for other, less-willing-to-cooperate countries.
14. In the political arena, a PFC designation would undermine Menem's ability and enthusiasm -- and perhaps his desire -- to continue to back US foreign policy goals around the world. Argentine has unfailingly supported critical UN peacekeeping efforts in areas such as Croatia, Bosnia, and Haiti, contributed to nuclear non-proliferation and missile technology control schemes, backed regional cooperation efforts on counterterrorism and money laundering, and firmly backed the US on key human rights issues such as Cuba. In short, the US counts on Argentine support on a wide range of international and regional issues -- support which will be endangered by imposing sanctions on Argentina over the lone issue of pharmaceutical patents.
A MEDIUM AND LONG-TERM STRATEGY
15. We fully appreciate that Argentina's present pharmaceutical patents regime is unacceptable and that pressure must be maintained to promote prospects of future progress and to preserve US credibility on the issue. However, a medium to long-term strategy involving concerted pressure in multilateral fora such as WTO and the FTAA process, continued US diplomatic efforts backed by strong EU support, technical support to Argentina's (sic) National Instate for Intellectual Property (INPI) and the Argentine judiciary and a sustained public relations / lobbying campaign by the MNC pharmaceutical industry in Argentina offers better long-term prospects for achieving our IPR goals on pharmaceuticals. Such an approach also avoids the considerable downside risks of sanctions.
16. A measured and sustained strategy medium to long-term would include the following elements:
- Immediate application of sustained pressure in multilateral fora. USTR should initiate a case against Argentina in the WTO based on standstill grounds (Ref B). In addition, US officials should use every opportunity in WTO and FTAA intellectual property working group sessions to highlight Argentina's deficiencies and to push for progress. The upcoming FTAA Belo Horizonte trade ministerial will provide such an opportunity.
- Press the EU and specific European countries, such as Germany and Switzerland, to lobby Argentina in a sustained, high profile fashion. As noted above, despite the substantial market share of European firms, the EU has been almost totally silent on this issue.
- Augment technical assistance to INPI and the Argentine judiciary. The next battlefield on pharmaceutical protection will be in the areas of administration and enforcement. INPI currently has a backlog of 13,000 patent applications and is ill-equipped to handle that caseload. Similarly, few judges have the necessary expertise to make sound rulings in this area. USPTO should deepen its relationship with the institute. USIS can also continue to play a role in working with INPI and the judicial community through exchange programs, such as the international / voluntary visitors programs and the US speakers program.
- Support for a stepped-up industry public relations / lobbying campaign in Argentina. The financial resources which PhRMA, its member companies, and European firms have devoted to public relations / lobbying in Argentina have been minimal, much less than those of the pirate industry. CAEME should now mount a coordinated (i.e. multinational) effort to put forward the positive message on the public benefits which protection of pharmaceuticals would provide. USIS and other elements of Embassy would actively support this effort.
- Have senior US visitors continue at every opportunity to press Argentine executive and legislative branches. President Clinton's visit to Argentina next year will afford an invaluable opportunity to remind Argentina of the importance of this issue.
17. Finally, the challenge to US foreign policy in dealing with this highly contentious issue is to artfully manage it in a way that both keeps the pressure on the GOA for more progress and avoids damage to our substantial economic and commercial interests in Argentina and injury to our very special relationship. We believe the measures recommended herein will do just that.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Pharmaceutical Patents in Argentina - Evaluating USG Options," Cable 7131 to the US Secretary of State, Washington DC, December 1996 as amended in American Embassy, Buenos Aires, Cable 7168 to the US Secretary of State, Washington DC, December 1996.
Introduction: Over the past six years the issue of patent protection for pharmaceutical products has become the number one hot-button issue besetting, and threatening, our otherwise superb and unique partnership with Argentina. I have been on the front lines of the fight for patents from the time of my arrival in Buenos Aires in July 1993, devoting more time to this subject than to any other. My lobbying efforts have been roundly denounced by the "pirate" pharmaceutical companies and their allies in the Argentine Congress, who have repeatedly called for my expulsion and passed a resolution to that effect in April, 1995. Several years of massive media coverage of my lobbying efforts ensure that I will be forever associated in the minds of Argentines with the "ley de patentes" issue.Our mammoth efforts have produced some positive results: in March, 1996 Argentina, breaking with a 132-year history of specifically denying any patent protection to medicines, enacted its first-ever law extending such protection. Unfortunately, the protection granted is inadequate to meet our demands of Argentina so the issue remains to plague and threaten our relations with it.
Before leaving the patent lobbying field to my successor, I would like to comment on certain myths which have come to encrust the Argentina / US patent issue as perceived by some Americans, both in government and the private sector. I would also like to lay out the realities of the issue and the alternatives available to the USG and our industry for achieving our mutual objective of "world-class" patent protection for pharmaceuticals in Argentina. End introduction.
MYTHS AND REALITIES
Myth: President Menem has repeatedly promised two American Presidents that he would deliver the full patent protection we desire / demand, and his senior officials have reaffirmed this on many occasions. They should be compelled by whatever means to honor this commitment.
Reality: Menem has repeatedly reaffirmed his personal support for full patent protection and promised to do all that he could to bring this about in Argentina. As a democratically elected President operating in a separation-of-powers system identical to that of the USA, he cannot (and I believe did not) promise to deliver something that is beyond his constitutional authority to guarantee.
Myth: If President Menem really wanted to he could compel the Argentine Congress to fulfill his commitment and enact the patent law he professes to support and which we seek. This is especially true when the Congress is being pulled in the opposite direction (as it clearly is by the powerful pirate lobby) and when the President's position enjoys minimal popular support (as it unfortunately does in the case of patents). The just-concluded session of Congress failed to enact over two-thirds of the President's legislative proposals, many of which he has repeatedly submitted over recent years. Most of what Menem has achieved in transforming Argentina since 1989 was accomplished by emergency decrees. This power, however, was restricted by the new (1994) Constitution and is not available for enacting a patent regime although Menem has pushed his powers to the limit in trying to deliver adequate patent protection.
Myth: We can accomplish our goals of patent protection in Argentina by imposing trade sanctions in retaliation for its failure to deliver.
Reality: First, it is unclear what sanctions we have at our disposal. Punitive tariffs under Special 301 would require compensatory offsets for WTO member Argentina. Argentina already exceeds the new, lower graduation threshold of GSP with its ample and growing per capita GDP. In any event, whatever sanctions might be available would not produce the results desired. Such unilateral punitive action on our part, however, would jeopardize our extensive trade and economic interests in Argentina and our special relationship in general. Some form of retaliation by the GOA would be assured. Pharmaceutical patent protection would not be improved in response to sanctions but could be weakened as opponents exploit a charged nationalistic atmosphere to enact a national working requirement similar to that of Brazil.
Myth: Punitive sanctions and tough treatment of Argentina are necessary to give disincentives to other countries to follow in Argentina's footsteps: our credibility is at stake.
Reality: Sanctions will enhance our credibility with others only if they are effective in obtaining their objective -- in this instance, improved patent protection in Argentina. No one will be impressed if we shoot ourselves in both feet, the most likely result of trade sanctions in the specific case of Argentina.
SITUATION AT PRESENT
- A patent law is on the books to take effect in November, 2000 (four more years) and applications for patents are already being accepted by the GOA. Some in our industry reject this regime as unacceptably inadequate. Others believe it has some value and are inclined to work with it. These different assessments result from worst and best case scenarios as to how the law and its accompanying regulations will be interpreted and implemented by the GOA and its intellectual property institute (INPI).
- A data exclusivity law will soon be enacted by the Congress and subsequently regulated and implemented by the executive. As of this writing we do not know the specific provisions of the law (it is a work in progress) but Menem's personal involvement in passing it gives cause for optimism. Although some in our industry downplay the value of this law, it is something which the USG has specifically demanded of the GOA for some time, so it is presumably worthwhile to have.
- For the foreseeable future, there is no prospect of wringing anything further from the Argentine Congress. Menem has gone as far as he can go with the limited Constitutional authority and political capital available to him for this purpose. Although Menem's political capital is not exhausted he has many top priority demands on it, including for remaining structural reforms that are more important to USG economic and commercial interests here than patents.
PROSPECTS / OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
- While continuing to press the patent issue, accept that we will, realistically, have to wait until 2000 before we have a law in effect. Leading up to this and thereafter we will need to lobby hard for the "best case" implementation of this law (e.g. the law provides for compulsory licensing but the provisions are ambiguous, and nothing obligates the GOA to issue such licenses.)
- Resolve the patent issue to our full satisfaction within the context of the to-be-negotiated FTAA agreement. We might be able to convince the GOA to anticipate the IPR requirements of the FTAA and improve its patent protection in advance of the agreement (as we have tried to do with Chile.) Since broad, free trade agreements have been our only assured means of obtaining world class IPR protection (e.g. NAFTA) this probably is the only realistic road to success with Argentina. The downside is a wait to 2005 for a FTAA.
- Negotiate with the GOA to try to resolve our respective trade complaints against one another within the context of a limited, bilateral trade agreement. At present we and the Argentines simply talk past one another -- we press hard on patents and specific duties issues and they respond with their litany of trade complaints (meat, peanuts, steel, tubing, leather, citrus, etc). Could we put our respective issues on the table and try to cut a quid pro quo deal? We have never attempted such a solution. But it might work. It would at least take us beyond the sterility and mutual recriminations of our current exchanges on bilateral trade issues.
- Try to use the mechanisms and provisions of the WTO to obtain better pharmaceutical patent protection from Argentina. This option has been considered within the USG but no initiatives have yet been taken. The problem will be making a sufficient case that Argentina is failing to comply with its WTO/GATT commitments.
- Take advantage of any significant industry investment in pharmaceutical research and testing in Brazil to strengthen our case for Argentina to improve its own patent protection. Keeping up with the Brazilians in trade and investment is mandatory for the Argentines. Substantial investments in Brazil would at least force the GOA to reconsider the inadequacies of its patent protection.
- Although never attempted, or even seriously explored, negotiations between the local industry and our pharmaceutical companies (and the Europeans) could be a way out of the current impasse and bring better patent protection. As the year 2000 approaches the local pirate industry may wish to get ahead of the power curve and provide for its own future under a regime of patent protection.
- Another conceivable way out for our industry would be to buy out the local drug producers and take them out of the pirate business altogether. One local pirate firm has already been acquired by and American company (Bristol-Myers Squibb), which presumably will make is a more "honest" producer.
CONCLUSION
As observed Ref A., the challenge to US foreign policy in dealing with the highly contentious pharmaceutical patents issue is to artfully manage it in a way that both keeps the pressure on the GOA for more progress and avoids damage to our substantial economic and commercial interests in Argentina and injury to our very special relationship with the GOA. This is not a prescription for just rolling over or sitting idly by and doing nothing. To the contrary, in Ref A we describe a number of measures that the USG and our industry can take to continue to actively and constructively pursue our patent protection goals in Argentina. The discussion of prospects for the future in Para 6 above also demonstrates that we are not at a dead end on patents in Argentina and other options are available to both the USG and our industry.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Safeguarding US - Argentina Relations: Myths, Realities and Options on Pharmaceutical Patents," Cable 7197 to the US Secretary of State, December 1996.
December 5th, 1996
The Argentine Congress has taken a short-term view on the patent protection issue. In providing temporary protection for a pirate domestic industry, it has insisted on a regime that is out of step with your program of modernization and economic reforms -- a program that has restored necessary vigor to the Argentine economy.The US is committed to protecting the legitimate investments of US pharmaceutical companies -- who lose approximately $500 million annually to Argentine pharmaceutical "pirates." In the long run, Argentina's own interests would also be better served by moving quickly to modernize its patent regime.
We know you share this view. We need to consider how, working together, we can advance this objective, while recognizing the constraints we both face.
December 6th, 1996
Intellectual Property Rights in Argentina: Comments about Possible US Actions.1. Argentina's patent legislation is in line with international rules concerning intellectual property.
Said legislation fully meets all WTO requirements. To accomplish this, the executive branch has resorted to different legal instruments at its disposal, including the use of its veto against pieces of legislation that it considered not to be adequate.
2. In order to meet higher standards of protection of intellectual property - beyond and above WTO requirements - the executive branch has the intention of further pursuing its approval. If that would prove not to be possible, it is ready to resort to other legal means at its disposal to attain those objectives.
3. Notwithstanding these circumstances, there exists the intention of applying certain economic sanctions against Argentina.
The following reasons make such actions highly undesirable and contrary to both states' best interests:
A) They would be self-defeating:
Sanctions would strengthen the position of those opposed to the government's efforts to reach higher standards of intellectual property rights protection, making the government's task more difficult.
B) They would discourage support for the government's endeavors.
Those backing the government would find little reason to continue to support its efforts in this field while the US has, for all practical purposes, closed the dialogue by adoption of sanctions.
C) Sanctions would be imposed in the field in which the US is benefiting most - trade:
Bilateral trade exceeds six billion dollars. The US has a trade surplus of around three billion dollars with Argentina, while is experiences deficits with most other countries.
D) The US attitude would compare negatively with the one assumed by other states and economic groupings with similar interests:
Other states and groupings - even more interested than the US in this field due to the level of their investments in the pharmaceutical industry of Argentina - have shown concern but have acted in a restrained manner, thus recognizing the government's efforts to find a solution and keep the dialogue open.
E) Sanctions would hamper the expectations raised by the new term of President Clinton in office:
Argentina and Latin America in general are confident that, in his second term in office, President Clinton would reinforce the links with Latin America, as he himself has ensured and his advisors reiterated recently. President Clinton's announced visit to the region would be a major event and would contribute to this goal. The initiative, however, would be clouded if sanctions are applied.
F) Sanctions would not contribute to the creation of a free trade area in the Americas, an initiative strongly supported by Argentina:
The adoption of sanctions would impact upon the role played by Argentina as a front runner in the support of the planned free trade area.
G) The adoption of such measures shortly after President Menem's most recent visit to the White House would compound their impact upon Congress and public opinion in Argentina:
Sanctions might strengthen the position of those who do not support the government's firm commitment to a close partnership with the US.
See White, Robin L., "Argentina with E," email to Susan M. Schmidt, 6 December 1996.
December 9th, 1996
Closehold, please, I spoke with JES (= Spero) further this morning. She hadn't thought a great deal about the pros and cons of the priority foreign country label. I suggested that there were still some questions to be thought through anyway on this. Bottom line: no answer yet about JES views.Re: timing, JES was sensitive to the potential harm of any pre-Christmas action against Argentina if Menem in fact moves heaven and earth to get the data exclusivity law passed. I think she views some form of suspension of GSP as a (justified) given, but wants to be sensitive to the timing of action.
See Kubiske, Lisa J., "RE: arg IPR," email to Robin L. White, 9 December 1996.
December 10th, 1996
Ambassador Cheek fears that these statements will undermine US insistence on pharmaceutical patent implementation. His comment at the close of his December 1996 cable to Secretary of State Warren Christopher follows:
Comment: with the end of USTR's out of cycle review of Argentina's pharmaceutical patent regime approaching, European firms and governments appear to be distancing themselves form us on this issue. The comments of Pabsch and Riegner will undercut our public and private arguments that sound patent protection is key to Argentine efforts to attract pharmaceutical investment. Riegner's remarks are particularly damaging, since Hoescht Marion Russel -- with annual sales of USD 135 million in Argentina -- is the third largest pharmaceutical firm in the world. With that in mind, emboffs have discussed Riegner's comments with industry representatives who plan to raise the issue at the next industry meeting.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Germans Downplay Pharmaceutical Patents," Cable 7319 to the US Secretary of State, December 1996.
December 12th, 1996
December 18th, 1996
See Schmidt, Susan "Background on Special 301" 18 December 1996.
December 19th, 1996
December 20th, 1996
Dear Mr. President:
Thank you for your letter. I too enjoyed our December meeting and am excited that we are moving forward on so many issues. I am delighted that our foreign ministers are moving ahead with plans to establish a special "consultative process" and will look to energize this process in the year ahead. In addition, Secretary Glickman reports progress on several of the agricultural initiatives we discussed.
Nevertheless, as we discussed in December, our governments face a difficult problem regarding the effort to enact adequate and effective patent protection in Argentina. I greatly appreciate your commitment to this goal, including your strong push to pass data exclusivity legislation in December. Even with the new legislation, Argentina still falls considerably short of effective protection. This situation gives me no alternative but to suspend half of Argentina's Generalized System of Preferences benefits as a signal of the importance we attach to the resolution of these issues.
Over the past several years, in the expectation the Argentine Congress would take steps to address significant shortcomings in Argentina's patent regime, the United States has postponed sanctions several times. However, the continued failure of the Argentine Congress to pass strong patent legislation imposes economic costs on both of our countries. It reduces Argentina's ability to attract foreign investment and the competitiveness of Argentine companies in global markets. And here at home, I am still concerned about the severe damage that the lack of effective patent protection in Argentina is causing to US companies and workers.
I trust that this action -- which we have carefully crafted as a measured response -- will not impair the deep respect and cooperation between our governments. You can be assured of my strong and continuing commitment to close cooperation with Argentina. As your letter notes, our shared vision for the region and the world will allow us to continue to work together on the eve of this new century as we have done in the past so successfully.
Sincerely,
Bill Clinton
See US Secretary of State, "Argentina IPR: Results of Out-of-Cycle Review," Cable 00713 to the American Embassy, Buenos Aires, January 1997.
January 6th-7th, 1997
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Argentine Press Reports US to Sanction Argentina over Pharmaceuticals," Cable 0076 to the US Secretary of State, January 1997.
January 14th, 1997
American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "GOA Discounts GSP Suspension Announcement," Cable 0228 to the US Secretary of State, January 1997.
January 15th, 1997
See Argentina Trade and Investment News, Argentine Embassy, Washington DC, Volume 4, No. 1, January / February 1999.
January 16th, 1997
See "Propieded Intelectual: Declaraciones Del Emajador Argentino en Washington," the Clarin, 16 January 1999. (In Spanish.)
Es cierto que estan en juego cientos de millones de dolares. Es cierto tambien que el lobby de la poderosa PhRMA ha sabido moverse en los bien regado canteros de Washington, hasta lograr el castigo deseado.(It is true that hundreds of millions of dollars are at stake. It is also true that the lobby of the powerful PhRMA has learned to navigate the well-watered flowerbeds of Washington until achieving the desired punishment.)
"Un Pais de Inventores," El Clarin 16 January 1997.
Serrichio, Sergio, "Raul Granillo Ocampo Arremete Contra la Sancion de los EEUU por Patentes: Desde Todo Punto de Vista, Estan Equivocados," El Cronista.
January 18th, 1997
See "Multinational Drug Companies Dictate US Trade Policy, Force US to Launch Unwarranted Economic Attack on Closest Ally in Hemisphere," PRNewswire, 18 January 1997.
February 4th, 1997
February 12th, 1997
See "EEUU Esta Muy Pesado con el Tema Patentes," La Razon 12 February 1997.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Renewed Argentine Interest in Pharmaceutical Patents," Cable 0876 to the US Secretary of State, February 1997.
February 13th, 1997
"La Investigacion en Argentina es una Aventura Personal," El Clarin13 February 1997.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Renewed Argentine Interest in Pharmaceutical Patents," Cable 0876 to the US Secretary of State, February 1997.
February 18th, 1997
"Submission of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America for the "Special 301" Report on Intellectual Property Barries: Priority Foreign Countries," 18 February 1997.
Coble, Howard, Washington DC, Letter to William Daley, Washington DC, 18 February 1997.
March 7th, 1997
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Pharmaceutical Patents in Argentina -- Still Contentious, No Change Likely," Cable 1280 to the US Secretary of State, March 1997.
March 24th-27th
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "GOA Links Telecommunications to Progress on Other Trade Issues," Cable 1567 to the US Secretary of State, March 1997.
April 1st, 1997
See US Secretary of State, Washington DC, "The Secretary's 4/01/97 Meeting with Argentine FM Di Tella," Cable 063571 to the US Embassy in Buenos Aires, April 1997.
Early April, 1997
Bryan,I am following up on the memo I sent to you a few weeks ago on the next steps in Argentina. As we are at a decision point in the Special 301 process, the points I made in the memo are not very timely. Any countries on which there remains disagreement after today will be forwarded to the TPSC, and we expect at that point that positions will harden.
USTR wants to maintain Argentina on the priority watch list, and schedule an out of cycle review. Other agencies are still reviewing the recommendation, but appear to be leaning towards supporting it. ARA, we understand, wants no OCR. We are prepared to support that position, so long as we can tell the other agencies that in the next year we will use public and private methods to raise various IPR issues of concern to us. What we want to be able to assure them is that the State Department will use all of its "good offices" aggressively to advance this discussion. I think that other agencies, rightly or wrongly, perceive the Department and Embassy BA as obstacles to raising IPR issues -- pharmaceutical and other -- rather than making efforts to press for movement. Issues such as resolving the question on protection for computer software through legislation and the courts, bringing the data exclusivity law into (at a minimum) TRIPs compliance, and stepping up enforcement efforts immediately come to mind.
I would appreciate it if you could confirm that our two Bureaus will move forward cooperatively on these issues in the next year. With that assurance, EB is more than willing to advocate leaving Argentina on the PWL without an out-of-cycle review. We then will have 12 months or so to use other tools to advance this difficult agenda.
Shaun
April 7th, 1997
See US Secretary of State, Cable 053959 to the American Embassy in Buenos Aires, March 1997.
April 8th, 1997
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Argentine Upbeat About Progress on Commercial Issues During FM Di Tella Visit," Cable 1833 to the US Secretary of State, April 1997.
April 9th, 1997
See Heimbold, Charles A., New York City, Letter to William M. Daley, Washington DC, 9 April 1997.
April 15th, 1997
See Clinton, William J. Intention to Withdraw Benefits for 50 Percent of Argentina's Exports Under the Generalized System of Preferences Program Message to the 105th Congress, 1st Session, 15 April 1997.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "GSP Suspension Announcement Triggers Criticism of US," Cable 1946 to the US Secretary of State, April 1997.
See Ibid.
April 18th, 1997
April 23rd, 1997
We remain skeptical that any of the "retaliation" bills will become law, but many Deputies clearly see this as a winning issue in an election year. In the current atmosphere, it is doubtful the Argentine or other elements of the country's patent regime through implementing regulations or other administrative actions.
April 30th, 1997
May 5th, 1997
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Argentina: 301 Priority Watch List Rating Well-Received," Cable 2313 to the US Secretary of State, May 1997.
May 7th, 1997
May 9th, 1997
May 12th, 1997
June 9th, 1997
Mid-June, 1997
- The Special 301 and GSP decisions are not the USG's final efforts regarding IPR protection in Argentina. Adequate protection of intellectual property rights is sure to be a topic of discussion during President Clinton's visit to Argentina this fall.
- We would like Presidents Clinton and Menem to be able to recognize that our IPR agenda has moved forward. Although it is unlikely that agreement can be reached on certain issues such as pharmaceutical product patent protection, we believe that progress can be made on other IPR issues before President Clinton's visit.
- (A) pending action is the promulgation of regulations to implement the recently enacted data exclusivity law. As you know, the US government and US private sector interests have identified substantial concerns with that legislation as enacted. We expect that the implementing regulations promulgated will include provisions to preclude competitors from relying on data submitted by others in obtaining marketing approval for their products.
- What is the status of the regulations? We would be interested in your strategy for moving the process forward and the projected timing for promulgation of the regulations.
- Similarly, we would like to suggest that the Government of Argentina consider other improvements that the executive branch could make that could be implemented to mitigate the concerns of the pharmaceutical industry until patent protection for pharmaceutical products enters into force. These could include improvements to the procedures used by the Argentine National Administration of Medicine, Foods, and Medical Technology (ANMAT) and improvements to Decree 260 or procedures in the National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI) that would increase transparency and efficiency.
See US Secretary of State, Washington DC, "Demarche on IPR Issues," Cable 2376 to the US Embassy in Buenos Aires, June 1997.
June 24th, 1999
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Argentine Congressional Foe of Pharmaceutical Patents Renews Attacks on Local Patent Office Director," Cable 3246 to the US Secretary of State, June 1997.
July 14th, 1997
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "EU Voices Concerns to GOA About Argentine Patent Regime," Cable 3929 to the US Secretary of State, August 1997.
See also Union Europea, Delegacion de la Comision Europea en la Republica Argentina Memorandum: Proteccion de Patentes e Informaciones Confidenciales en Argentina. (In Spanish)
August 12th, 1997
August 19th, 1997
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Pharmaceuticals -- Argentine Health Minister Positive on Data Confidentiality Regulations," Cable 4158 to the US Secretary of State, Washington DC, August 1997.
August 22nd, 1997
September 9th, 1997
Secretary of State Madeline Albright later writes to the US Embassy in Buenos Aires to summarize the meeting. Her notes on the discussion of Argentina read:
Argentina
4. Pilnik told A/S Davidow that Lilly had learned lessons from its previous experiences in Argentina and intended to be more pragmatic -- emphasizing relationship building rather than confrontation. He admitted that previously Lilly "hadn't done its homework" in Argentina, but had now formed (sic) an pharmaceutical manufacturers' association in Argentina (CAEME) and hired a public relations consultant to help develop a strategy which would include educating the Argentine public about the real costs of pharmaceutical patents.
5. Pilnik commented that the GOA's handling of the data exclusivity law and drafting of regulations had been disappointing. He hoped that the new GOA regulations would link registration or products with approval of process patents as a way of stemming Argentine piracy that was costing the US pharmaceutical industry millions of dollars. As an example, he mentioned that Lilly had spent years developing a new drug for schizophrenia that had been copied by pirates and was available in Argentina two weeks after Lilly had released it for distribution.
6. Pilnik said Lilly and other manufacturers would continue to press the patents issue, but wondered if the GOA would be at all responsive. He asked A/S Davidow to make sure that the USG did not give up on this issue and that this be on the agenda of the President or Commerce Secretary Daley for the October POTUS visit to Argentina.
7. A/S Davidow stated that he was not optimistic that the GOA Congress would change its mind on pharmaceutical patents. The pirates have popular support for their compelling argument that they make high quality products for low prices. It would take significant educational efforts to turn that around. Nevertheless, he added, we discuss this issue in every conversation we have with high-level GOA officials, and will continue to do so.
8. DAS Samuel said that we intended to pursue IPR issues with greater vigor after the October Congressional elections in Argentina, and that we would remind President Menem of his promises to improve IPR laws. He and Schmidt mentioned that the USG was evaluating whether to ask the GOA to submit its IPR regime to the WTO IPR council for advisory review, as a way of bringing peer pressure on the GOA to make its IPR laws TRIPs-consistent by 2000.
See US Secretary of State, Washington DC, "Assistant Secretary Davidow's September 9 Meeting With Eli Lilly Representatives," Cable 172851 to the US Embassy in Buenos Aires, September 1997.
October 3rd, 1997
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Meeting with Chief of Cabinet Rodriguez," Cable 5119 to the US Secretary of State, Washington DC, October 1997.
November 19th, 1997
See American Embassy, "Charge's Introductory Call on Secretary of Trade and Industries Alieto Guadagni," Cable 5925 to the US Secretary of State, November 1997.
December 5th, 1997
See US Department of State, "Assistant Secretary's Daily Activity Report," ARA / BSC 5 December 1997.
Norma Felix of INPI tells Lehman that the executive branch hopes Congress will ratify the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) in 1998 to increase the potential for cooperation between INPI and foreign patent offices. She also says that INPI hopes for technical assistance from other patent offices and WIPO.
Jose Machinea says that he is interested in learning more about use of an intellectual property system to increase investment, but is skeptical that patents alone will be sufficient in inducing multinational labs to conduct research in Argentina.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "USPTO Commissioner Visits Argentina January 13-14," Cable 0270 to the US Secretary of State, January 1998.
Mid-January, 1998
John M. Desmond sends an e-mail January 15th to Susan M Schmidt, James T Heg, Benjamin I Muskovitz, David F Rogus, and Richard M Sanders with the subject line "Argentina and GSP." It reads:
There has been some discussion about the possibility of removing the other half of Argentina's GSP benefits in response to the GOA's lack of action on IPR reform. This needs to be considered in the context of Argentina's possible graduation from the GSP program - will this be our last chance to use this tool, or, conversely, if they do what we want and avoid the sanctions, will we send the wrong signal by graduating them anyway?I spoke with Roger Freeman of EB / ODC about GSP graduation for Argentina. He said that last year the Administration had favored graduation of several countries including Argentina and Brazil, for financial / budgetary reasons; i.e., to reallocate their shares to less- developed countries because they had relatively high incomes and were significant users. However, Congress opted for a one-year renewal for all countries. Therefore, the only countries that graduated were those above the income threshold. This year, given the financial crisis in Asia, the Administration is taking a lower profile and intends to ask Congress for another one-year extension, meaning that the financial / budgetary reasons will not come into play. Roger thinks it unlikely that Congress would oppose the Administration's proposal, given their stance last year.
More critical is the per capita GNP threshold for automatic graduation. The USG lowered this in August 1996 from $11,800 to $8,600 (based on World Bank data) +escalation based on US GNP growth (e.g. if the US GNP grew at 3%, then the threshold would increase by 3% to about $8860 in 1997). Countries that passed this threshold in 1996 will graduate this year, 2 years after the determination.
In Argentina's case, the most recent per capita GNP figure (December 1996) is $8485. Assuming Argentina grew at 8% in 1997, its new per capita GNP would be $9160 as of December 1997 - over the 1997 limit. Up to date figures on 1997 GNP will not be available until March, but it is clear that Argentina is on the bubble regarding automatic graduation, and we need to think about this carefully in the IPR context.
January 29th, 1998
Comment: Since former Economy Minister Cavallo resigned last July, senior MINECON officials have preferred to leave the controversial pharmaceutical patent and related data confidentiality issue to MFA. Unfortunately, MFA officials -- citing Argentine Congressional opposition -- are unwilling to try to address our concerns about data confidentiality through the regulations. Nevertheless, we are asking for an appointment with MFA to continue to press the issue directly with Campbell.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Argentina: Senior Economy Ministry Official Says Progress on Data Confidentiality Unlikely," Cable 0574 to the US Secretary of State, January 1998.
February 23rd, 1998
February 27th, 1998
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "European Diplomats Prod Argentine Officials on Patent Regime," Cable 1105 to the US Secretary of State, March 1998.
April 3rd, 1998
Felix also reports that an Argentine Senate committee has recommended Senate ratification of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT).
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Argentine Movement on Data Confidentiality Regulations, Other IPR Issues," Cable 1733 to the US Secretary of State, April 1998.
April 7th, 1998
Sadous, Eduardo A., Buenos Aires, Letter to Vittorio Alloco, Buenos Aires, 7 April 1998.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Argentina: Proposed Agenda for IP Bilateral," Cable 1656 to the US Secretary of State, April 1998.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Argentine INPI Director Felix Under Fire (Again) From Congressional IPR Foes," Cable 1756 to the US Secretary of State, April 1998.
April 14th, 1998
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Argentine Congress Threatens Retaliation if US Suspends Remaining GSP Privileges." Cable 1948 to the US Secretary of State, Washington DC, April 1998.
Week of April 25th, 1998
She speculated that the Congressional requests are part of an effort by the local pharmaceutical industry to force her resignation. Felix noted that while the local industry has long sought her removal, it has redoubled its efforts since she became a candidate for a deputy director position in WIPO. Felix said the local industry strongly opposes her WIPO candidacy, and hopes to derail it by forcing her out of her current post.Charge Rochas comments:
Members of the Argentine Congress have repeatedly criticized Felix in the past for her alleged support for US pharmaceutical interests, and she has always managed to weather the storm. Still, it is unfortunate that the current Argentine Congressional attack centers on her participation in technical IPR consultations with the US. If the Argentine executive bows to Congressional pressure and removes Felix, it does not bode well for future US-GOA dialogue on pharmaceuticals and other IPR issues.See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Argentine Congress Renews Attacks on INPI Director," Cable 2178 to the US Secretary of State, April 1998.
May 1st, 1998
Argentine Ambassador to the US Diego Guelar says he is satisfied with the US decision not to withdraw Argentina's remaining GSP benefits or impose other sanctions.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Argentina: GOA Content with Outcome of Special 301 Review," Cable 2228 to the US Secretary of State, May 1998.
Mid-May, 1998
Ruiz agreed the draft's language is problematic, and said Argentina will support our proposed changes. He attributed Argentina's initial support for the draft to the efforts of the Health Ministry, explaining that some health officials fear TRIPS may adversely affect their public health efforts.See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Argentina and the Revised Drug Strategy at the World Health Assembly," Cable 2417 to the US Secretary of State, May 1998.
May 17th, 1998
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Europeans Criticize Argentine Pharmaceutical Patent Regime," Cable 2534 to the US Secretary of State, Washington DC, May 1998.
June 1st, 1998
June 9th, 1998
TRIPs article 70.9 states:
Where a product is the subject of a patent application in a Member in accordance with paragraph 8(a), exclusive marketing rights shall be granted, notwithstanding the provisions of Part VI, for a period of five years after obtaining marketing approval in that Member or until a product patent is granted or rejected in the Member, whichever period is shorter, provided that, subsequent to the entry of force of the WTO agreement, a patent application has been filed and a patent granted for that product in another Member and marketing approval obtained in such other Member.
July 1998
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Argentina Congress Questions Regulatory Delays in Authorizing Sale of Pirate Viagra," Cable 3425 to the US Secretary of State, July 1998.
September 10th, 1998
October 7th, 1998
Despite Ruiz's comments, we suspect that Argentina's sophisticated and aggressive pirate pharmaceutical industry will lobby the GOA to support the South African position. Hence, we would not be surprised if, in the end, the GOA reverses course and at least tacitly supports the South African view.See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Argentina: Intellectual Property Rights in the World Health Organization," Cable 5240 to the US Secretary of State, October 1998
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Argentina and Pharmaceuticals: Executive Unlikely to Enforce Exclusive Marketing Rights for US Firm," Cable 5509 to the US Secretary of State, October 1998.
October 23rd, 1998
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, "Argentina: Embassy Urges GOA to Enforce US Firm's Exclusive Marketing Rights," Cable 5583 to the US Secretary of State, October 1998.
December 1998
January 20th-21st, 1999
One area of concern is the protection of intellectual property. We are extremely interested in seeing that Argentina's IPR regime comports in a timely manner with the WTO obligations of Argentina, and we look forward to Argentina's full implementation of the provisions included in TRIPs.However, our concerns have been heightened by recent moves taken by the Government of Argentina that seem to indicate deterioration rather than improvement on this issue. Some of this deterioration involves current TRIPs obligations of the Argentine government.
For example, we are extremely concerned by the failure of the Argentine government to provide exclusive marketing rights (EMR) for pharmaceutical products and by the weakening of protection provided to test data submitted by agrochemical firms.
February 9th, 1999
The recommendation was prompted by well-documented reports of growing administrative chaos within INPI, as well as the perception that the controversial Felix had become overly involved in the making of IPR policy. Cuervo said the previous INPI board was hopelessly divided, often taking up to 6-7 months to approve simple administrative matters. Similarly, in conjunction with the Foreign Affairs Ministry, Felix had pursued several contentious policy initiatives without consulting with the Trade and Industry Secretariat. This had made her the target of Argentine Congressional criticism, further distracting her from her administrative responsibilities.Cuervo says that Horacio Jaquenod, the new INPI director, will focus on administrative duties instead of intellectual property policy. The Embassy cable elaborates:
Cuervo said the interventor (Horacio Jaquenod) will focus on improving INPI's administrative capacities and facilitating the processing of patent applications. INPI officials will no longer be involved in the formulation of IPR policy -- an area that will be reserved for Congress and the Economy Ministry -- and will adhere strictly to the letter of the existing patent law and executive decrees when ruling on specific issues.Cuervo also says that Argentina will not delay its implementation of TRIPs, but a cable from the US Embassy to Secretary of State Madeline Albright reports that he later claimed in conversation with a colleague that such a delay in implementation would not violate the TRIPs agreement.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, Cable 0726 to the US Secretary of State, Washington DC, February 1999.
February 11th, 1999
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, Cable 0762 to the US Secretary of State, Washington DC, February 1999.
See "Exclusive Marketing Rights for Lipitor in Argentina" Warner-Lambert Co., 14 December 1999.
April 1999
SUMMARY 1. The biggest irritant in Argentine-US bilateral relations over the last five years -- and probably over the next five as well -- has been pharmaceutical patent protection. This cable provides background information on the issue to help Washington agencies on the eve of the Special 301 process. It reviews US goals and assesses tools to achieve concrete progress on these issues. END SUMMARYINTRODUCTION
2. [Paragraph 2 is classified in its entirety.]
WHAT'S AT STAKE?
3. Total sales of prescription pharmaceutical products in Argentina were USD 3.756 billion in 1998, making Argentina the third largest market in Latin America and the thirteenth largest in the world. Local pirate firms controlled 52 percent of the market, down from a peak of 59 percent in 1992, with European and US firms holding 27 percent and 16.5 percent respectively. German and Swiss companies accounted for almost 70 percent of the European market share. Of the top 50 pharmaceutical firms, 23 were Argentine, 15 were European, and 12 were US. A local pirate -- Roemmers -- was the market leader with a 7.84 percent share. US firms estimate that they lose over USD 500 million a year in sales because of the pirates.
MARKET TRENDS
4. Overall pharmaceutical sales have stagnated at approximately USD 3.6 billion since 1995, primarily as a result of severe budget problems in the public health sector and union-managed health providers. In this context, the fall in the pirate market share since 1992 stems largely from the entry of new multinational firms in the 1990's, as well as the purchase of local pirates by multinationals. During 1993-1998, 13 multinationals -- including 5 US firms -- opened new operations in Argentina. (FYI: numerous multinationals closed their operations in Argentina in the 1980s, often selling their interests to local pirates.) Similarly, eight multinationals bought controlling interests in pirate firms. Total new investment in the pharmaceutical sector from 1994-1998 reportedly exceed USD 800 million.
5. The Argentine market is a "branded generic" market, meaning that local pirates do not compete with multinationals on the basis of price. In fact, most pirates charge prices comparable to those set by multinationals. The pirates' ability to avoid generic pricing reflects their strong marketing position and absence of research and development costs, buttressed by their control of the main distribution channels for pharmaceuticals. The three main distributors of pharmaceuticals -- Rofina, Disprofarma and Pharmnet -- are controlled by pirates and cooperate to protect margins and maintain price discipline. Most multinationals use these distributors, since the alternative, i.e. development of one's own distribution net, would be very costly. The three firms recently tightened their hold on distribution by acquiring several independent wholesale companies.
6. [Paragraph 6 is classified in its entirety.]
7. The lack of patent protection -- coupled with the pirates' strong marketing positions and control of local distribution channels -- has led many multinational firms to enter into licensing or co-marketing arrangements with the pirates. For example, Pfizer signed its first co-marketing agreement with Bago six years ago. More recently, Pfizer agreed to co-market Viagra with the same pirate firm. Roemmers also has co-marketing deals with several multinationals. Local managers of US firms complain that Argentina's unequal playing field forces them into such arrangements in order to survive.
A HISTORY OF CONFLICT
8-9. [Paragraphs 8 and 9 are classified in their entirety.]
10. Decree 260 recognizes the principle of patent protection for pharmaceuticals, but defers the grant of such patents until November 2000. The decree grants the Argentine patent office (INPI) broad grounds for issuing compulsory licenses and contains ambiguous language on parallel imports. It does not provide pipeline protection for products patented prior to January 1994. These defects were exacerbated by Argentina's enactment of a flawed data confidentiality law in December 1996. The law -- negotiated by the Foreign Affairs Ministry (MFA) with Justicialist party Deputy and then Industry Committee chairman Humberto Roggero -- facilitates the copying of products by local pirates. The executive has yet to issue implementing regulations for the data law, but the Agricultural Secretariat has used it to justify the removal of the protection previously accorded data submitted for agrochemicals.
PIRATES VS. MULTINATIONALS
A FUTURE GOVERNMENT LIKELY TO BE UNHELPFUL
11-17. [Paragraphs 11-17 are classified in their entirety.]
18. Lilly's travails have continued even after INPI granted it an EMR for olanzapina. Argentina's FDA equivalent -- the National Administration of Medicine, Food, and Medical Technology (ANMAT) -- has refused Lilly's request that it revoke the registration of a pirate version of olanzapina already on the market, arguing that it lacks the legal authority to enforce an EMR. In fact, ANMAT has registered several other pirate versions since Lilly obtained the EMR. Lilly's efforts to seek relief through the Argentine courts have to date been fruitless. Meanwhile, a pirate firm has succeeded in obtaining a court order enjoining INPI from enforcing the EMR against its product. The pirate has also challenged the legal basis for INPI's original grant of the EMR. The complicated legal situation ensures that Lilly will face extensive legal delays and costs before it receives any concrete benefits from the EMR.
US STRATEGY: ENDS AND MEANS
[The remaining paragraphs are classified in their entirety.]
April 21st, 1999
See "Exclusive Marketing Rights for Lipitor in Argentina," Warner-Lambert Co., 14 December 1999.
Late April, 1999
TALKING POINTS- In accordance with Section 301 of the US Trade Act, the Administration must conduct an annual review of the practices of our trading partners to determine if there is adequate and effective protection for intellectual property and to determine if fair market access is provided to the products dependent on intellectual property.
- On April 30, US Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky will announce in a press release the results of this year's Special 301 review.
- We wish to inform you that Argentina remains on the priority watch list.
- Our governments have spent the better part of the past decade discussing the intellectual property issue.
- The failure of the Argentine government to provide adequate and effective patent protection for pharmaceutical products continues to be of great concern to the US government.
- Even more troubling has been the deterioration of intellectual property protection over the past year -- both as regards protection for confidential test data for agrochemicals and the Argentine government's failure to provide exclusive marketing rights as required by TRIPs article 70.9.
- We look forward to moving our discussion of these issues to Geneva and to the Argentine government's expeditiously bringing its industrial property regime into compliance with your country's WTO obligations. It was disappointing that our governments were unable to meet on the margins of the TRIPs council meeting last week.
- On the copyright side, the passage in late 1998 of a bill criminalizing software piracy was a positive step, and we look to Argentina to ensure its effective implementation. We look forward to working with you as Argentina ensures that the copyright regime meets TRIPs standards by January 1, 2000.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, Cable 9343 to the US Secretary of State, Washington DC, April 1999.
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, Cable 2127 to the US Secretary of State, Washington DC, May 1999.
May 5th, 1999
American Embassy, Buenos Aires, Cable to the US Secretary of State, Washington DC, May 1999.
May 6th, 1999
See World Trade Organization, "Argentina - Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals and Test Data Protection for Agricultural Chemicals - Request for Consultations by the United States." Document No. 99-1954.
May 10th, 1999
May 12th, 1999
May 14th, 1999
May 17th, 1999
May 18th, 1999
May 20th, 1999
American Embassy, Buenos Aires, Cable to the US Secretary of State, Washington DC, May 1999
May 26th, 1999
May 27th, 1999
May 28th, 1999
June 2nd, 1999
See "Exclusive Marketing Rights for Lipitor in Argentina," Warner-Lambert Co., 14 December 1999.
June 8th, 1999
_____________________________________________________________________ told us June 8th that after discussions _____________________________________ he is working to try and "put the brakes" on Argentine Congressional efforts extending pharmaceutical patent transition period from 2000 to 2005. ________ cautioned that it would not be easy to achieve, but said he believed that the legislation could be indefinitely bottled up in committee.Charge Rocha comments that despite the "formidable foe" of local industry in Congress, the Embassy "will continue to lobby other key legislators and executive officials to oppose the legislation."
June 16th, 1999
American Embassy, Buenos Aires, Cable 2836 to the US Secretary of State, Washington DC, June 1999.
June 17th, 1999
June 18th, 1999
July 5th, 1999
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, Cable 3125 to the US Secretary of State, Washington DC, July 1999.
July 16th, 1999
(Jaquenod) complained to US July 16 about continuing press criticism of his management of INPI. He charged that the local association of patent attorneys is behind the media attacks, and said the negative press coverage is hindering his ability to run the Institute effectively. For example, it would be difficult for him to finalize pending exclusive marketing rights (EMR) applications, if he were busy defending his personal integrity.
July 23rd, 1999
See American Embassy, Buenos Aires, Cable to the US Secretary of State, Washington DC, July 1999.
August 5th, 1999
See "Exclusive Marketing Rights for Lipitor in Argentina," Warner-Lambert Co., 14 December 1999.
September, 1999
September 30th, 1999
October 5th, 1999
See "Exclusive Marketing Rights for Lipitor in Argentina," Warner-Lambert Co., 14 December 1999.
October 22nd 1999
See "Exclusive Marketing Rights for Lipitor in Argentina," Warner-Lambert Co., 14 December 1999.
November 16th, 1999
November 17th, 1999
November 19th, 1999
December 3rd, 1999
December 14th, 1999
December 21st, 1999
December 28th, 1999
February, 2000
February, 2000
See "Argentina Reviews IPR Laws; US Commerce Sec Warns Over Local Production Plans" Marketletter 28 February 2000 as replicated in Foster, James F., "Daley" Email to Jeff C. Irwin, 3 March 2000.
March, 2000
March 19th, 2000
See "Medicamentos, Entre los Mas Caros del Mundo" La Nacion, 19 March 2000. (In Spanish)
A second article printed in the "Economia y Negocios" section elaborates on the study's findings and discusses the sources of the price increases. Journalist Juan Aznarez cites Martin Massini Ezcurrea, director of CAEME, as saying that price increases for research-based medicines are due to increasing costs of research.
See Aznarez, Juan "En la Argentina, los Precios de los Medicamentos Suben sin Remedio" La Nacion 19 March 2000.
March 21st, 2000
See Creamer, John S. "PhRMA Briefing" E-mail to Andrew N. Bowan and Kevin K. Sullivan, 21 March 2000.
March 22nd, 2000
The author also discusses whether the charge that local firms are acting as pirates is merited. He quotes an unnamed source as stating that the foreign firms were never forced to operate in Argentina, where they are knowingly putting their products at risk of copying. The same source says in Spanish that "The true pirates have been the multinational companies. Various important firms bought smaller local labs that used to copy their products as well as those of other multinational companies. When they did this, they didn't immediately remove the copied products of other multinational companies from the market. Is that ethical behavior or piracy?"
See "Marca Registrada" La Nacion 22 March 2000 (In Spanish)
See Ezcurra, Martin Massini, "Patentes: No Todos Investigan" El Clarin 22 March 2000.
March 23rd, 2000
March 26th, 2000
May 30th, 2000
April 6th, 2000
April 28th, 2000
Laudonia Mara, El Cronista, 28 April 2000. As translated in US Cable LAP2000428000029.
April, 2000
July 2000
September 2000
October 24th, 2000
US
Argentina